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Noncompetes and Other Post-Employment 
Restraints on Competition: Empirical Evidence 
from Trade Secret Litigation 
CHRISTOPHER B. SEAMAN† 
Noncompete clauses in employment agreements are both common and controversial. An 
estimated twenty-eight million Americans—nearly twenty percent of the U.S. workforce—are 
currently bound by a noncompete. The traditional view that noncompete agreements can facilitate 
increased productivity by encouraging employers to invest in employee training has been 
challenged by numerous legal and economics scholars in recent years, who contend noncompetes 
hinder employment options for skilled workers and limit information spillovers, which are both 
vital drivers of innovation. Based on these claims, several states have recently limited the 
enforcement of noncompetes, and legislation is pending at the federal level to effectively ban 
noncompete agreements for certain types of workers. 
Despite their widespread use, empirical research regarding noncompetes is fragmented and 
incomplete. In particular, there have been few empirical studies based on actual employment 
agreements. This Article helps fill an important gap in the existing literature. Using a novel 
dataset of noncompete agreements that have been publicly disclosed in trade secret litigation in 
federal court, it finds that noncompetes are more frequently enforced against technical and sales 
personnel, instead of high-ranking corporate executives. In addition, it finds that noncompetes 
are common for employees with a base salary below $100,000 per year and that California-based 
employees are significantly less likely to be bound by a noncompete. The implications of these 
and other findings from the dataset are discussed in the final Part of the Article. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Contractual provisions that limit an employee’s ability to compete with a 
former employer are both common and controversial.1 An estimated twenty-
eight million employees—nearly twenty percent of the U.S. labor force—are 
currently bound by a noncompete agreement.2 Although existing research 
suggests covenants not-to-compete and other post-employment restraints on 
competition, such as non-solicitation agreements, are more common among 
highly-skilled employees,3 they occur at all levels of the workforce. News stories 
have highlighted the use of noncompetes in low-wage, low-skill positions,4 
including fast food employees,5 pet sitters,6 beauticians,7 exterminators,8 camp 
 
 1. See, e.g., Norman D. Bishara, Kenneth J. Martin & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of 
Noncompetition Clauses and Other Restrictive Postemployment Covenants, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1, 5 (2015) 
(“Restrictive covenants remain controversial today, even as they have seemingly proliferated among 
employers.”) (footnote omitted); Gillian Lester, Restrictive Covenants, Employee Training, and the Limits of 
Transaction-Cost Analysis, 76 IND. L.J. 49, 49 (2001) (explaining that “restrictive covenant[s] prohibit[ing] an 
employee from competing with the employer within a certain geographic area for a specified time period after 
departure” are “an increasingly common feature of employment, used across a wide range of industries, 
occupations, and employees”); Viva R. Moffat, The Wrong Tool for the Job: The IP Problem with 
Noncompetition Agreements, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 873, 876 (2010) (“As the use of noncompetes has become 
more widespread, controversy over these agreements has also increased.”). 
 2. Evan Starr, J.J. Prescott & Norman Bishara, Noncompete Agreements in the U.S. Labor Force, J.L. & 
ECON. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 5), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2625714. 
 3. Id. at 6–7.  
 4. See Sophie Quinton, These Days, Even Janitors Are Being Required to Sign Non-Compete Clauses, 
USA TODAY (May 27, 2017, 8:28 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2017/05/27/noncompete-
clauses-jobs-workplace/348384001 (“Big companies often ask top executives who have access to confidential 
business information to sign noncompete agreements. But low-wage, unskilled laborers such as janitors, 
landscapers and entry-level health workers are often asked to sign them, too.”). 
 5. In one well-publicized example, the sandwich chain Jimmy John’s required its “sandwich makers” to 
agree not to work at a “competitor” (which it broadly defined as any business that “derives more than ten percent 
(10%) of its revenue from selling submarine, hero-type, deli-style, pita and/or wrapped or rolled sandwiches” 
that is “located with [sic] three (3) miles” of any Jimmy John’s store) for two years after employment. Dave 
Jamieson, Jimmy John’s Makes Low-Wage Workers Sign ‘Oppressive’ Noncompete Agreements, HUFFPOST 
(Oct. 15, 2014), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/jimmy-johns-non-compete_n_5978180. After litigation, 
Jimmy John’s agreed that it would not enforce noncompetes for all current and former employees and to remove 
them from training materials for new hires. See Samantha Bomkamp, Jimmy John’s Agrees to Pay $100,000 to 
Illinois AG over Noncompete Contracts, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 7, 2016, 2:11 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/ 
business/ct-jimmy-johns-settlement-1208-biz-20161207-story.html. 
 6. See, e.g., Dave Jamieson, Doggy Day Care Chain Makes Pet Sitters Sign Noncompetes to Protect 
‘Trade Secrets’, HUFFPOST (Nov. 24, 2014, 7:31 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/camp-bow-
wow_n_6207544; see also Paw Shop, LLC v. Mestre, No. 601950/08, 2008 WL 8675213 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 
28, 2008) (granting a preliminary injunction that prohibited a former employee from providing dog walking 
services to owners whose pets were serviced by the plaintiff within a ten mile radius of the former employer’s 
stores based on a noncompete agreement). 
 7. See, e.g., Koby Levin, As Non-Compete Agreements Proliferate, So Do Lawsuits, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
(Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/70f0855282de4329908957fa7b1e278d (describing a noncompete 
that prevented a hair stylist in Missouri from accepting a position with another salon). 
 8. See, e.g., Paramount Termite Control Co. v. Rector, 380 S.E.2d 922, 925–26 (Va. 1989) (upholding a 
noncompete agreement prohibiting a pest control worker from working for a competitor for two years after 
termination of employment), overruled by Home Paramount Pest Control Companies, Inc. v. Shaffer, 718 S.E.2d 
762 (Va. 2011). 
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counselors,9 and college interns.10 These restraints may adversely impact 
workers’ ability to negotiate with their existing employer and to switch 
positions, potentially depressing wages and decreasing labor mobility.11  
There are divergent theories regarding the impact of noncompetes and 
other post-employment restraints on innovation. The historically dominant view 
is that noncompetes can facilitate innovation by incentivizing firms to invest in 
employee training, fostering the dissemination of information within the firm, 
and preventing the unauthorized disclosure of trade secrets and other valuable 
business information.12 Under this approach, the reasonableness standard for 
evaluating the enforceability of noncompetes13—which remains the 
predominant approach in most jurisdictions14—adequately protects their 
benefits to employers while also reducing the negative impact on employees by 
constraining contractual overreach.  
More recently, however, some legal and economics scholars contend that 
noncompete agreements are generally detrimental to innovation. For example, 
in a well-known and influential study, Ronald Gilson compared innovation in 
California’s Silicon Valley to Massachusetts’s Route 128 corridor and attributed 
Silicon Valley’s success to California’s refusal to enforce noncompetes in most 
circumstances.15 Building on this work, scholars like Orly Lobel and Viva 
Moffat have argued that noncompete agreements and other post-employment 
restraints unduly hinder employment options for skilled workers, who are a 
critical source of talent and new ideas.16 In their view, noncompetes effectively 
 
 9. See, e.g., Steve Greenhouse, Noncompete Clauses Increasingly Pop Up in Array of Jobs, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 8, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/09/business/noncompete-clauses-increasingly-pop-up-in-
array-of-jobs.html (describing a noncompete clause that prohibited a nineteen-year-old college student from 
working as a camp counselor at a nearby competing camp). 
 10. See, e.g., Jack Chapman, What If They Want Me to Sign a Non-Compete Agreement?, LADDERS (Feb. 
27, 2020), https://www.theladders.com/career-advice/they-want-me-to-sign-a-non-compete-agreement 
(describing a case where a college student was blocked from accepting employment with the client of an 
advertising agency that she had interned with due to a noncompete agreement). 
 11. See WHITE HOUSE, NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS: ANALYSIS OF THE USAGE, POTENTIAL ISSUES, AND 
STATE RESPONSES 2 (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/non-competes_report_ 
final2.pdf. 
 12. See generally Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1960); 
Edmund W. Kitch, The Law and Economics of Rights in Valuable Information, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 683 (1980); 
Paul H. Rubin & Peter Shedd, Human Capital and Covenants Not to Compete, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 93 (1981). 
 13. The reasonableness standard for noncompetes can be traced to the landmark English decision in Mitchel 
v. Reynolds (1711) 24 Eng. Rep. 347; 1 P. Wms. 181. See Jonathan M. Barnett & Ted Sichelman, The Case for 
Noncompetes, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 953, 958 (2020). 
 14. California is the obvious counterexample. See infra notes 48–51 and accompanying text. 
 15. See generally Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: 
Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (1999); ANNALEE SAXENIAN, 
REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128 (1994). But see 
Barnett & Sichelman, supra note 13, at 978–1007 (critiquing conventional views of the Silicon Valley versus 
Route 128 comparison and suggesting that other legal constraints on labor mobility, such as trade secret and 
ERISA litigation, undermine this narrative). 
 16. See, e.g., ORLY LOBEL, TALENT WANTS TO BE FREE: WHY WE SHOULD LEARN TO LOVE LEAKS, RAIDS, 
AND FREE RIDING (2013); Moffat, supra note 1, at 893–97; Viva R. Moffat, Making Non-Competes 
Unenforceable, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 939, 984 (2012). 
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serve as human capital controls.17 Ultimately, critics of noncompetes argue that 
they stifle rather than promote innovation, which in turn can negatively impact 
economic growth.18 In addition, some economists and business law scholars 
have conducted studies which suggest that noncompetes adversely affect the 
mobility of skilled labor.19 In light of these critiques, legislation has been 
introduced in Congress to significantly restrict the enforcement of 
noncompetes,20 and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) recently held a public 
hearing regarding their potential anticompetitive effects.21 Furthermore, 
numerous states recently have enacted laws curtailing noncompetes, often by 
prohibiting their application to lower-income workers.22 
 
 17. See Orly Lobel, The New Cognitive Property: Human Capital Law and the Reach of Intellectual 
Property, 93 TEX. L. REV. 789, 790 (2015) (describing “postemployment restrictions, including noncompetition 
contracts, nonsolicitation, nonpoaching, and antidealing agreements” as forms of “contractual controls on human 
capital”); Viva R. Moffat, Human Capital as Intellectual Property? Non-Competes and the Limits of IP 
Protection, 50 AKRON L. REV. 903, 907 (2017) (“The subject matter of non-competes is people—human 
beings—and the goal of those agreements is to control that human capital.”). 
 18. See infra notes 77–84 and accompanying text. 
 19. See, e.g., Matt Marx, Deborah Strumsky & Lee Fleming, Mobility, Skills, and the Michigan Non-
Compete Experiment, 55 MGMT. SCI. 875 (2009) (using change in noncompete law in Michigan during the 1980s 
as a natural experiment and finding a statistically significant decrease in labor mobility among Michigan 
inventors) [hereinafter Marx et al., The Michigan Non-Compete Experiment]; Matt Marx, Jasjit Singh & Lee 
Fleming, Regional Disadvantage? Employee Non-Compete Agreements and Brain Drain, 44 RSCH. POL’Y 394 
(2015) (finding that noncompetes drive skilled worked to states that decline to enforce such agreements) 
[hereinafter Marx et al., Regional Disadvantage?]; Sampsa Samila & Olav Sorenson, Noncompete Covenants: 
Incentives to Innovate or Impediments to Growth, 57 MGMT. SCI. 425 (2011). 
 20. See, e.g., Workforce Mobility Act of 2020, H.R. 5710, 116th Cong. (2020); Workforce Mobility Act 
of 2019, S. 2614, 116th Cong. (2019); Workforce Mobility Act of 2018, S. 2782, 115th Cong. (2018); Workforce 
Mobility Act of 2018, H.R. 5631, 115th Cong. (2018). 
 21. Non-Competes in the Workplace: Examining Antitrust and Consumer Protection Issues, FED. TRADE 
CMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/non-competes-workplace-examining-antitrust-
consumer-protection-issues (last visited Apr. 19, 2021).  
 22. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 925 (West 2021) (prohibiting employers from entering into choice of forum or 
choice of law agreements with California workers); S.B. 3163, 99th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2016) (codified at 820 
ILL. COMP. STAT. 90 et seq. (2017)) (prohibiting employers from entering into noncompetes with low-wage 
workers); ME. STAT. tit. 26, §§ 599-A to 599-B (2019) (prohibiting noncompetes where the employee’s wages 
are at or below 400% of the federal poverty level); S.B. 328, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2019) (codified at MD. 
CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-716 (West 2021)) (prohibiting noncompetes for employees earning $15 an hour 
or less, or $31,200 per year); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 24L (2021) (prohibiting noncompetes for non-exempt 
employees, interns, and employees 18 years old or younger, and limiting most noncompetes to one year in 
duration); NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.195 (2020) (requiring employers to offer valuable consideration for 
noncompetes); S.B. 197, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2019) (codified at N.H. REV. STAT. § 275.70-a (2020)) 
(prohibiting noncompetes for employees who earn an hourly rate equal to or less than 200 percent of the federal 
minimum wage); H.B. 2992, 80th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2019) (codified at OR. REV. STAT. § 653.295 
(2020)) (limiting noncompetes by, inter alia, requiring employers to inform employees at least two weeks before 
starting work that a noncompete is required, the employee must made more than four times the median family 
income as calculated by the Census Bureau, and the duration of the noncompete agreement is limited to 18 
months following termination of employment); 28 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-59-3 (2020) (similar to Massachusetts); 
S.B. 480, 2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2020) (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-28.7:8 (2021)) (prohibiting 
noncompetes for certain low-wage employees); H.B. 1450, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2019) (codified at 
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 49.62.020–.030 (2021)) (prohibiting noncompetes against employees making equal to or 
less than $100,000 and independent contractors making equal to or less than $250,000 annually, and presuming 
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Despite their importance, existing empirical research regarding the scope, 
frequency, and impact of noncompete agreements and other post-employment 
restraints on competition remains fragmented and incomplete.23 Moreover, 
many of the empirical studies conducted thus far have significant limitations 
based on the methodologies and data sources used, a focus on particular types 
of employees (for example, CEOs and doctors), and/or the timing of the study.24 
In particular, very few studies “examin[e] the terms of actual employment 
contracts” regarding noncompetes because “employment contracts are not 
generally publicly available.”25 
This Article aims to make a substantial, new contribution to the growing 
but inchoate body of empirical research regarding noncompetes and other post-
employment restraints. Specifically, it uses a hitherto-untapped data source: 
breach of employment contract claims asserted as part of trade secret litigation 
in federal court under the Defend Trade Secrets Act.26 Using this resource, the 
Author created an original dataset of over 500 noncompete agreements and other 
contractual limitations on post-employment competition. Each of these 
agreements were then hand coded for a variety of information, including the 
employee’s job position, his or her salary, the duration and scope of the 
noncompete clause, and the relevant governing law.  
Several interesting findings emerge from this dataset, including that half of 
post-employment restraints on competition in trade secret litigation involve 
claims against technical, engineering, customer service, or sales staff, rather than 
high-ranking corporate executives, and that over a quarter of noncompetes apply 
to employees who have a base salary of $100,000 per year or less. This study 
also found evidence supporting the existence of the so-called “California effect”; 
namely, that employment agreements covering California employees are 
substantially less likely to include a covenant not-to-compete. Instead, 
 
that any noncompete with a duration exceeding 18 months after termination of employment is unreasonable and 
unenforceable). 
 23. See Bishara et al., supra note 1, at 10 (“Despite the heated discussion of the pros and cons of restrictive 
covenants . . . there are few empirical studies examining these agreements to provide evidence and guidance for 
businesses, employees, or policymakers.”); Norman D. Bishara & Evan Starr, The Incomplete Noncompete 
Picture, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 497, 500 (2016) (“[T]he existing legal and empirical research on the 
prevalence and impacts of noncompetes in the U.S. labor market remains piecemeal and unsatisfactory.”); J.J. 
Prescott, Norman D. Bishara & Evan Starr, Understanding Noncompetition Agreements: The 2014 Noncompete 
Survey Project, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 369, 372 (“[W]e know surprisingly little about the frequency, scope, 
and strength of noncompetition agreements across the country.”). 
 24. See Bishara et al., supra note 1 (reporting the results of a sample of employment contracts for Chief 
Executive Officers of large, publicly-traded firms disclosed in federal securities filings); Kurt Lavetti, Carol 
Simon & William D. White, The Impacts of Restricting Mobility of Skilled Service Workers: Evidence from 
Physicians, 55 J. HUM. RES. 1025 (2020) (reporting results form a 2007 survey of physicians regarding 
noncompete clauses by state and employment status); Prescott et al., supra note 23 (using self-reported responses 
from an online survey); Peter J. Whitmore, A Statistical Analysis of Noncompetition Clauses in Employment 
Contracts, 15 J. CORP. L. 483 (1990) (studying a sample of appellate decisions on noncompete agreements from 
the 1960s and 1980s). 
 25. Bishara et al., supra note 1, at 10, 24. 
 26. Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376. 
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California firms appear to rely on non-solicitation agreements—which prohibit 
an employee from lobbying customers or recruiting employees or their former 
employer—as a substitute. Ultimately, the methodology used for this study can 
serve as a springboard for future research regarding not just noncompetes, but a 
variety of contractual provisions that may affect innovation policy, such as 
nondisclosure agreements and invention assignment clauses. 
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides an 
overview of the various types of contractual provisions that may limit an 
employees’ ability to compete with their former employer. It then discusses the 
various theories regarding the role of covenants not-to-compete in innovation 
policy and the development of human capital. Next, it summarizes the existing 
empirical research regarding noncompetes, including the limitations of prior 
research. Part II describes the research objectives, study design, and data 
collection process for this empirical research project. It also notes several 
potential methodological limitations of this study. Part III explains the key 
findings from the dataset. Finally, Part IV discusses some implications of these 
results and potential directions for future research.  
I.  POST-EMPLOYMENT RESTRAINTS ON COMPETITON  
AND INNOVATION POLICY 
A. AN OVERVIEW OF POST-EMPLOYMENT RESTRAINTS 
Employers have used contract law to limit the ability of former employees 
to compete against them for hundreds of years.27 While employed, a worker is 
bound by various legal doctrines that prevent against unfair competition with the 
employer, such as the duty of loyalty.28 But once a job ends—regardless of the 
reason—these duties terminate, and “the departing employee is generally free to 
engage in any lawful competition.”29 As a result, “[t]he employee’s valuable 
knowledge, skills, and relationships walk out the door when the employee 
leaves.”30 
 
 27. See Blake, supra note 12, at 626 (noting covenants not to compete “comprise one of the traditional 
common-law ‘restraints of trade’ and present problems which have kept them before the courts for more than 
five hundred years”); see also id. at 629–37 (discussing English case and statutory law regarding post-
employment covenants dating back to the 1400s). 
 28. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 8.01(a) (AM. L. INST. 2015) (“Employees in a 
position of trust and confidence with their employer owe a fiduciary duty of loyalty to the employer in matters 
related to their employment.”); id. § 8.01(b)(2) (providing that “competing with the employer while employed 
by the employer” is a breach of this duty); see also Michael Selmi, The Restatement’s Supersized Duty of Loyalty 
Provision, 16 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 395, 400 (2012) (“Employees can . . . be seen as agents, and the duty 
of loyalty generally requires that employees not harm their employer.”). 
 29. Bishara et al., supra note 1, at 11; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 8.05 (“A 
former employee may compete with, or work for, a competitor of the former employer . . . unless: (a) the former 
employee is bound by an agreement not to compete . . . or (b) . . . the former employee discloses, uses, or by 
words or conduct threatens to disclose or use, specifically identifiable trade secrets of the former 
employer . . . .”). 
 30. Bishara et al., supra note 1, at 11. 
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Understandably, employers are reluctant to let such talent and knowledge 
voluntarily depart, potentially to the benefit of a competitor. One tool to prevent 
this is contractual restraints on post-employment competition, which can 
“temporarily maintain the status quo that existed prior to the employee’s 
departure,” thus effectively retaining the employer’s “competitive advantage by 
contract,” at least for a limited time.31 Post-employment restraints also can 
prevent an employee from misappropriating trade secrets (and other confidential 
business information) by disclosing or using this information to the former 
employer’s detriment.32 But these same restraints also can interfere with 
individuals’ personal autonomy and right to earn a living.33 In addition, because 
noncompete agreements and other post-employment restraints are facially 
anticompetitive, they may negatively impact social welfare by reducing 
entrepreneurship, depressing employee wages and job satisfaction, and 
preventing the sharing of knowledge and ideas.34 
There are several types of contractual post-employment restraints on 
competition.35 The first, and perhaps best known, is a covenant not-to-compete 
(CNC).36 CNCs prohibit an employee from joining a competitor or starting a 
 
 31. Id. at 12. 
 32. Blake, supra note 12, at 627 (“From the point of view of the employer, postemployment restraints are 
regarded as perhaps the only effective method of preventing unscrupulous competitors or employees from 
appropriating valuable trade information . . . for their own benefit.”). 
 33. See LOBEL, supra note 16, at 37 (“From the perspective of labor advocates, every man and woman 
should have the right to earn a living and pursue their profession, and noncompetes . . . and other forms of human 
capital controls are heavy infringements upon the pursuit of that livelihood and therefore upon happiness.”); 
Moffat, supra note 17, at 911–12 (exploring the impact of noncompetes on employees’ “personal autonomy and 
dignitary interests”). 
 34. See LOBEL, supra note 16; Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Leaky Covenants-Not-to-Compete as the Legal 
Infrastructure for Innovation, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 251, 253–54 (2015) (noting that noncompetes “interfere 
with the flow of information that naturally results when employees change firms,” which some scholars argue 
“play a critical role in spurring innovation”); Charles Tait Graves, Analyzing the Non-Competition Covenant as 
a Category of Intellectual Property Regulation, 3 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 69, 89 (2011) (contending that 
“the non-compete implicitly reflects a policy determination that” protecting employers from trade secret 
misappropriation “outweighs the potential social gains obtained through innovation, and the compensation and 
job satisfaction of individual employees who freely join or form competing businesses”); Moffat, supra note 17, 
at 917 (“Employees bound by non-competes tend to have less bargaining power and lower wages or salaries 
than those free of restriction.”); Christina L. Wu, Comment, Noncompete Agreements in California: Should 
California Courts Uphold Choice of Law Provisions Specifying Another State’s Law?, 51 UCLA L. REV. 593, 
609 (2003) (“Competition among employers for employees leads to better wages and working conditions for 
employees, because employers feel obliged to give their employees good working environments and salaries to 
induce them to stay.”). In their seminal treatise on the economics of intellectual property law, William Landes 
and Richard Posner admit that “[i]t is not even clear that enforcing employee covenants not to compete generates 
social benefits in excess of its social costs.” WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 371 (2003). 
 35. Bishara et al., supra note 1, at 12 (“There are several typical contract mechanisms employers use to 
restrict or penalize an employee’s postemployment competition.”). 
 36. “CNC” appears to be the most common abbreviation in the recent legal and economic literature on 
covenants not-to-compete. Some articles use “NCA” as an alternative abbreviation. See, e.g., Sharon K. Sandeen 
& Elizabeth A. Rowe, Debating Employee Non-Competes and Trade Secrets, 33 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 
438, 440 (2017). 
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new firm that would compete with the former employer.37 Many CNCs also 
prevent former employees from consulting or providing other assistance to a 
competitor that falls short of a formal employee/employer relationship.38 In 
addition, CNCs usually preclude an employee from serving as a director or 
officer for, or taking a substantial ownership interest in, a competing firm.39 
CNCs are often expressly limited in time (duration) and geographic scope,40 and 
some CNCs may also preclude the former employee from engaging in specific 
activities.41  
In most states, CNCs are enforceable if they are reasonable.42 Under this 
“rule of reason” approach, courts generally apply the test articulated in the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which provides that: 
(1) A promise to refrain from competition that imposes a restraint that is 
ancillary to an otherwise valid transaction or relationship is unreasonably in 
restraint of trade if 
(a) the restraint is greater than is needed to protect the [employer]’s 
legitimate interest, or 
(b) the [employer]’s need is outweighed by the hardship to the 
[employee] and the likely injury to the public.43 
As a result, CNCs are unreasonable if they are “more extensive in duration, 
geographical area, or type of activity than necessary to protect the employer’s 
[legitimate] interest.”44 Legitimate interests may include protecting valuable and 
 
 37. Gomulkiewicz, supra note 34, at 260 (“A covenant-not-to-compete forbids a departing employee from 
competing with a former employer either as an employee of an established rival firm or by starting a new firm.”); 
see Bishara & Starr, supra note 23, at 504 (“Covenants not to compete are a post-employment restrictive 
covenant between an employer and an employee that prohibits the employee from going to work for a competitor 
or otherwise competing with the former employer.”); see also Covenant Not to Compete, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“A promise, usu. in a sale-of-business, partnership, or employment contract, not 
to engage in the same type of business for a stated time in the same market as the buyer, partner, or employer.”). 
 38. See Bishara et al., supra note 1, at 37 (reporting that fifty-four percent of surveyed CEO contracts 
contain a CNC that “specifically prohibit entering a consulting agreement with a competitor”). 
 39. See Noncompete, Executive Compensation (CCH) ¶ 415 (2018), 2018 WL 2269228 (“Most non-
compete provisions contain fairly standard language that the employee or former employee cannot directly or 
indirectly own any interest in, operate, control or participate as a partner, director, principal, officer, or agent 
of . . . any company, person, or entity engaged in a competitive business. However, most non-competes also 
provide that: ‘Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, this Section shall not prevent the Employee from 
acquiring securities representing up to [1% – 5%] of the outstanding voting securities of any publicly held 
corporation.’”). 
 40. See Bishara et al., supra note 1, at 33 tbl.5, 36 tbl.7 (providing data on geographic and temporal limits 
on CNCs for CEO employment agreements). 
 41. See Whitmore, supra note 24, at 512–14 (discussing activity restraints in CNCs).  
 42. Gomulkiewicz, supra note 34, at 261. See generally BRIAN M. MALSBERGER, COVENANTS NOT TO 
COMPETE: A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY (11th ed. 2017). 
 43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 (AM. L. INST. 1981). 
 44. Emily J. Kuo, The Enforceability Gap of Covenants Not Compete in Telecommuting Employment 
Relationships, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 565, 571 (1996); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 
cmt. d (“The extent of the restraint is a critical factor in determining its reasonableness. The extent may be 
limited in three ways: by type of activity, by geographical area, and by time.”); RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT 
LAW § 8.06 (AM. L. INST. 2015) (providing that a CNC “is enforceable only if it is reasonably tailored in scope, 
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confidential business information, customer goodwill, and unique skills or 
training.45 One of the most common rationales for CNCs is “the protection of 
intellectual property, especially trade secrets.”46 Because trade secret protection 
can be easily lost—for example, by accidental or intentional disclosure by a 
former employee—courts are often deferential to employer claims that CNCs 
should be enforced to protect trade secret information.47  
In contrast, a minority of states, most notably California,48 generally refuse 
to enforce CNCs under the public policy of favoring workers’ freedom of 
mobility.49 The relevant California statue, section 16600 of the Business and 
Professions Code, states: “Except as provided in this chapter, every contract by 
which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or 
business of any kind is to that extent void.”50 As a result, the California Supreme 
Court has held that this law “prohibits employee noncompetition agreements 
unless the agreement falls within a statutory exception.”51 Several other states, 
including Illinois and Oregon, limit CNCs to particular categories of workers.52 
Another type of restrictive covenant is a non-solicitation agreement 
(NSA).53 NSAs prevent departing employees from soliciting business from their 
 
geography, and time to further a protectable interest of the employer,” with certain narrowly delineated 
exceptions such as employer bad faith or material breach of contract). 
 45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 cmt. b; see also RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW 
§ 8.07 (listing “trade secrets . . . and other protectable confidential information that does not meet the definition 
of [a] trade secret,” “customer relationships,” “investment in the employee’s reputation in the market,” and the 
“purchase of a business owned by the employee” as legitimate interests for a CNC). 
 46. Gomulkiewicz, supra note 34, at 261; see also Outsorce Int’l, Inc. v. Barton, 192 F.3d 662, 670 (7th 
Cir. 1999) (Posner, J., dissenting) (“The clearest case for [CNCs] is where the employee’s work gives him access 
to the employer’s trade secrets.”); Sandeen & Rowe, supra note 36, at 456 (“[T]he protection of trade secrets 
has long been considered a legitimate business interest that can justify a[] [CNC].”). 
 47. See Sandeen & Rowe, supra note 36, at 447 (suggesting that courts are deferential to employers’ 
assertions that CNCs are necessary to protect their alleged trade secrets, “even though the requirements for trade 
secret protection have become more exacting since adoption of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act”). 
 48. Other states that generally refuse to enforce CNCs are North Dakota and Oklahoma. See N.D. CENT. 
CODE § 9-08-06 (2019); OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 219A (2021). 
 49. See Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 277, 292 (Ct. App. 2002) (“Business and Professions 
Code section 16600 generally prohibits covenants not to compete, and California public policy strongly favors 
employee mobility.”); see also Bishara et al., supra note 1, at 14–15; Gomulkiewicz, supra note 34, at 264. 
Some courts have recognized that California law may permit post-employment restraints on competition if it is 
“necessary to protect the employer’s trade secrets.” Metro Traffic Control, Inc. v. Shadow Frame Network, 27 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 573, 577 (Ct. App. 1994) (citing Muggill v. Reuben H. Donnelly Corp., 398 P.2d 147, 149 (Cal. 
1965)); see also Barnett & Sichleman, supra note 13, at 984 (“Section 16600 does not preclude an employer 
from preventing a departing employee via injunctive relief from joining a new employer by enforcing 
nondisclosure, nonsolicitation, or other similar postemployment obligations when doing so promotes the 
employer’s interest in protecting its trade secrets.”). 
 50. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2021). 
 51. Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 189 P.3d 285, 288 (Cal. 2008). 
 52. See 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 90/5 (2017) (prohibiting CNCs for employees who make less than $13 per 
hour or the minimum wage under applicable law); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 653.295, 653.020 (2020) (limiting CNCs 
to certain employees, including individuals who engage in salaried “professional work” and perform 
“predominantly intellectual, managerial, or creative tasks”). 
 53. Bishara et al., supra note 1, at 7 (describing NSAs as a “subcategory of CNCs”). But NSAs are typically 
much narrower than CNCs in that they do not prevent most or all competition with the former employer—
April 2021] NONCOMPETES & POST-EMPLOYMENT RESTRAINTS 1193 
former employer’s clients and/or attempting to hire their employees for a 
specific period of time.54 The latter type of NSA (prohibiting the solicitation of 
employees) is sometimes called a non-poaching or non-raiding clause.55 Like 
CNCs, NSAs may be justified based upon the employer’s legitimate interests in 
protecting its goodwill and confidential business or trade secret information, 
such as customer lists and preferences.56 But because NSAs are more limited in 
scope than CNCs—they prohibit only certain types of post-employment 
conduct—some states that generally refuse to enforce CNCs may permit NSAs 
if they further an employer’s legitimate interest and are reasonable in scope.57  
Many employment agreements also contain non-disclosure agreements 
(NDAs) requiring that employees keep confidential trade secrets and other 
valuable business information that is not widely known.58 NDAs that restrict the 
 
instead, they only prohibit certain types of conduct. In addition, some jurisdictions that largely prohibit CNCs 
are substantially more permissive of NSAs. See infra note 57 and sources cited therein. 
 54. See Bishara et al., supra note 1, at 12 (describing NSAs as “related to pursuing clients and recruiting 
other employees”); Erin E. Gould, Comment, Read the Fine Print: A Critical Look at Oregon’s Noncompete 
and Nonsolicitation Agreement Laws, 88 OR. L. REV. 515, 519 (2009) (“[N]onsolicitation 
agreements . . . prohibit an employee from soliciting business from the employer’s customer list, soliciting 
employment from the employer’s current employees, or both.”). 
 55. See, e.g., PrecisionIR Inc. v. Clepper, 693 F. Supp. 2d 286, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (non-raiding); Greg 
T. Lembrich, Note, Garden Leave: A Possible Solution to the Uncertain Enforceability of Restrictive 
Employment Covenants, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2291, 2295 n.16 (2002) (non-poaching). 
 56. See Jerrick Robbins, Comment, A Solution to Utah’s Non-Compete Dilemma: Soliciting the Use of 
Non-Solicitation Agreements, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1227, 1254–56 (2017) (contending that NSAs “promote an 
employer’s goodwill by preventing an employee from drawing away the customers and other employees that 
partially define this goodwill” and may help protect an employer’s customer lists). 
 57. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 219B (2021) (“A contract or contractual provision which prohibits an 
employee or independent contractor of a person or business from soliciting, directly or indirectly, actively or 
inactively, the employees or independent contractors of that person or business to become employees or 
independent contractors of another person or business shall not be construed as a restraint from exercising a 
lawful profession, trade or business of any kind.”); OR. REV. STAT. § 653.295 (2020) (prohibiting certain types 
of noncompetition agreements but not nonsolicitation agreements); Gould, supra note 54, at 517–18 (“[I]t 
appears that [section 653.295] applies only to noncompete agreements and does not apply at all to nonsolicitation 
agreements, leaving nonsolicitation agreements free from any statutory restrictions.”); see also Michael Selmi, 
Trending and the Restatement of Employment Law’s Provisions on Employee Mobility, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 
1369, 1381 (2015) (noting that NSAs “had traditionally been scrutinized lightly” compared to CNCs “because 
they were a lesser form of restraint”).  
  The case law in California is muddled regarding the enforceability of NSAs. Some older lower court 
decisions indicated that California statutory law prohibiting contractual restraints on employment “does not 
invalidate an employee’s agreement . . . not to solicit [the former employer’s] customers.” Loral Corp. v. Moyes, 
219 Cal. Rptr. 836, 841 (Ct. App. 1985); accord Webb v. W. Side Dist. Hosp., 193 Cal. Rptr. 80, 84–85 (Ct. 
App. 1983) (upholding an arbitration decision enforcing a no-hire clause). But in 2008, the California Supreme 
Court struck down a one-year NSA that prohibited the defendant from soliciting his former employer’s 
customers, holding that it was “invalid because it restrained [the employee’s] ability to practice his profession.” 
Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 189 P.3d 285, 292 (Cal. 2008). More recently, several federal and state court 
decisions in California have called Loral into question, holding that it is no longer good law in light of Edwards. 
See, e.g., WeRide Corp. v. Huang, 379 F. Supp. 3d 834, 852 (N.D. Cal. 2019); Conversion Logic, Inc. v. 
Measured, Inc., No. 219CV05546ODWFFMX, 2019 WL 6828283, at *3–4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2019); Barker 
v. Insight Global, LLC, No. 16-CV-07186-BLF, 2019 WL 176260, at *2–3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2019); AMN 
Healthcare, Inc. v. Aya Healthcare Servs., Inc., 239 Cal. Rptr. 3d 577, 587–90 (Ct. App. 2018). 
 58. Bishara et al., supra note 1, at 3; see also id. at 42 (finding nearly all CEO employment agreements 
studied contained an NDA). 
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use and transfer of knowledge in a business context are potentially 
anticompetitive.59 However, unlike CNCs, “a standalone NDA does not 
necessarily restrict an employee’s mobility options” because “[t]he employee 
can still move to a competitor.”60 NDAs are widely used and permissible, even 
in states like California where CNCs are generally not enforced.61 
B. THEORETICAL VIEWS REGARDING NONCOMPETES 
Traditional economic theory views CNCs and other contractual post-
employment restrictions on competition as important legal tools for the 
development of human capital.62 Firms can increase their productivity—and 
thus their profitability—by investing in training of their workforce.63 This may 
involve general training of transferrable skills, specific training that is most 
valuable to the current employer, or both.64 Absent a CNC, however, “an 
incentive for opportunistic behavior is created” once a worker receives this 
training, “either by going to work for himself or by going to work for another 
firm, which will pay him a premium because of the value of his training.”65 As 
a result, “employers would underinvest in research, development, and employee 
training”—particularly “general training” that is readily transferrable to a new 
position—without post-employment restraints like CNCs.66 
Second, under the traditional view, CNCs are justifiable as an effective 
method for firms to protect against the intentional or accidental disclosure of 
confidential business information, including trade secrets, to their competitors.67 
Even though employers can (and often do) contractually require their employees 
not to disclose trade secret information after termination through an NDA, this 
may prove insufficient, as a former employee may be unable to ignore the 
 
 59. Id. at 7. 
 60. Id. at 20. 
 61. Id. at 21. 
 62. See generally Blake, supra note 12; Kitch, supra note 12; Rubin & Shedd, supra note 12; see also Mark 
A. Glick, Darren Bush & Jonathan Q. Hafen, The Law and Economics of Post-Employment Covenants: A Unified 
Framework, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 357 (2002). 
 63. See Samila & Sorensen, supra note 19, at 425 (“Companies can increase their productivity by training 
workers, developing new products and processes, and building relationships with customers and suppliers.”); 
see also Eric Garton, The Case for Investing More in People, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 4, 2017), 
https://hbr.org/2017/09/the-case-for-investing-more-in-people. 
 64. GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS WITH SPECIAL 
REFERENCE TO EDUCATION 11–18 (1964). 
 65. Rubin & Shedd, supra note 12, at 97; see also Blake, supra note 12, at 652 (explaining that absent 
post-employment restraints on competition, an employer “cannot be sure” that an employee it has trained “will 
stay on so that [its] investment will be rewarded, since contracts for personal services are not usually specifically 
enforced”). 
 66. On Amir & Orly Lobel, Driving Performance: A Growth Theory of Noncompete Law, 16 STAN. TECH. 
L. REV. 833, 837 (2013); see also Blake, supra note 12, at 652 (“Unless some enforceable commitment or 
effective deterrent is possible, employers will not be justified in making the optimum outlay on employee-
training programs . . . .”). 
 67. Blake, supra note 12, at 667–74; see also Moffat, supra note 1, at 900 (“It is often asserted that 
noncompetes are necessary for the protection of trade secrets . . . . Noncompete agreements regularly cite trade 
secrets or confidential information as the ‘protectable interest’ sought to be guarded with the contract.”). 
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information learned in their previous job while working for a competitor.68 
Moreover, a post hoc breach of contract claim against a former employee for 
violating an NDA may be ineffective at undoing the harm caused.69 
Consequently, “[t]he most effective protective device” for trade secrets and 
other proprietary business information “is an enforceable covenant not to 
compete.”70 
More recently, however, numerous legal and economics scholars have 
forcefully challenged the traditional view regarding the normative desirability 
of CNCs.71 First, they contend that CNCs negatively impact the mobility of 
skilled labor, which adversely affects employee productivity and economic 
efficiency.72 By definition, CNCs constrain employees’ freedom to work, 
temporarily precluding them from taking another position in the same field as 
their former employer. This effectively sidelines highly educated and valuable 
workers, wasting their time, atrophying their skills, and potentially degrading 
their professional networks.73 Even if it is unclear whether the CNC would 
apply, the in terrorem effect of a potential lawsuit may cause the former 
employee to refrain from seeking new employment during the CNC.74 At the 
same time, an employee subject to a CNC may be less attractive on the job 
market, as the risk of litigation may deter a prospective new employer—
 
 68. See Blake, supra note 12, at 669–70 (“Even in the best of good faith, a former technical or ‘creative’ 
employee working for a competitor . . . can hardly prevent his knowledge of his former employer’s confidential 
methods or data from showing up in his work.”). 
 69. See id. at 669 (“[T]he important thing to the employer is not having a cause of action in case of a breach 
of confidence, but preventing the violation from occurring. An injunction not to disclose can seldom undo or 
effectively prevent the doing of the real damage.”). 
 70. Id. at 670. 
 71. See generally LOBEL, supra note 16; Amir & Lobel, supra note 66; Norman D. Bishara, Covenants Not 
to Compete in a Knowledge Economy: Balancing Innovation from Employee Mobility Against Legal Protection 
for Human Capital Investment, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 287 (2006); Mark J. Garmaise, Ties That Truly 
Bind: Noncompetition Agreements, Executive Compensation, and Firm Investment, 27 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 376 
(2009); Gilson, supra note 15; Marx, The Michigan Non-Compete Experiment, supra note 19; Moffat, supra 
note 1; Moffat, supra note 17; Samila & Sorensen, supra note 19. But see Barnett & Sichelman, supra note 13, 
at 975–78 (responding to some of these arguments); Jonathan M. Barnett & Ted Sichelman, Revisiting Labor 
Mobility in Innovation Markets 12–29 (USC Gould Sch. of L. Ctr. for L. & Soc. Sci., Research Paper Series No. 
CLASS16-13, 2016), https://perma.cc/V2T9-6UGC (critiquing some of the most widely-cited empirical studies 
that contend noncompetes reduce labor mobility). 
 72. See Blake, supra note 12, at 650 (“Anything that impedes an employee’s freedom of access to a job in 
which [the employee’s] productivity . . . would be higher, involves a cost in terms of the economy’s welfare.”). 
 73. See Garmaise, supra note 71; Charles Tait Graves & James A. DiBoise, Do Strict Trade Secret and 
Non-Competition Laws Obstruct Innovation?, 1 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 323, 331 (2006) (“An inventive 
employee . . . . wants to start a new company . . . . But his employer included a boilerplate non-competition 
covenant in his employment contract, and he is sidelined for a year from any activity that his employer might 
deem competitive. He must instead pursue a business less suited to his talents, or in which he has less experience. 
Waiting for one year means a wasted period, and few, if any, employees have the means to do nothing for a year 
before launching a competitive business.”); see also Marsh USA Inc. v. Cook, 354 S.W.3d 764, 780–81 (Tex. 
2011) (Willett, J., concurring) (“Economic dynamism in the 21st century requires speed, knowledge, and 
innovation—imperatives that must inform judicial review of efforts to sideline skilled talent. Courts must 
critically examine noncompetes in light of our contemporary, knowledge-based economy that prizes ingenuity 
and intellectual talent.”) (footnote omitted). 
 74. Moffat, supra note 1, at 888. 
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especially if the former employer is a deep-pocketed incumbent in the same 
industry.75 Thus, by limiting mobility, CNCs can “reduce the average quality of 
matches between employees and employers,” adversely impacting “the 
productivity of companies.”76 As a result, critics of CNCs argue they can harm 
both employees and their prospective new employers. 
Second, CNCs may depress employees’ wages. A noncompete “has an 
inevitable tendency to reduce an employee’s . . . bargaining power during his 
employment,” as the employee cannot freely switch positions,77 thus 
diminishing the threat that the employee will depart for higher wages 
elsewhere.78 Indeed, CNCs are often the product of a preexisting disparity in 
bargaining power. “[A]s a general matter, employers have vastly more power in 
the negotiation and performance of the employment relationship. This 
asymmetry heavily influences the existence and character of [CNCs].”79 As Viva 
Moffat has noted, CNCs “are rarely negotiated and, indeed, are often entered 
into well after the employment relationship has begun,” when the employee’s 
bargaining power is low.80 And as previously mentioned, the threat of CNCs 
may require employees to take “occupational detours” to avoid potential 
litigation, which can harm their lifetime earnings.81 
Third, CNCs may impede entrepreneurship and adversely affect 
innovation. By limiting labor mobility, CNCs can hinder employees from 
leaving their former employers to launch a new firm. This may occur directly by 
preventing a startup from competing against its founders’ previous employer(s), 
as well as indirectly by making it more difficult for a startup to hire an 
experienced workforce.82 In addition, CNCs interfere with the flow of 
information that occurs when employees change firms.83 Scholars who favor 
 
 75. See Matt Marx & Lee Fleming, Non-Compete Agreements: Barriers to Entry . . . and Exit?, 12 
INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 39, 52 (2012) (“[N]on-competes may favor large firms over small ones because of 
the asymmetric costs of the legal system.”). 
 76. Samila & Sorensen, supra note 19, at 428. 
 77. Blake, supra note 12, at 648. 
 78. See Russell Korobkin, Bargaining Power as Threat of Impasse, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 867, 869 (2004) 
(discussing the role of competing job offers in bargaining using negotiation theory). 
 79. Moffat, supra note 1, at 885 (footnote omitted). 
 80. Id. at 884. However, some states require additional consideration—such as a promotion or raise—to 
support a noncompete entered into during employment. See, e.g., Socko v. Mid-Atl. Sys. of CPA, Inc., 126 A.3d 
1266, 1274–75 (Pa. 2015); Charles T. Creench, Inc. v. Brown, 433 S.W.3d 345, 351–54 (Ky. 2014). But see 
Runzkeimer Int’l, Ltd. v. Friedlen, 862 N.W.2d 879, 890–92 (Wis. 2015) (holding that continued employment 
is sufficient consideration to support a noncompete entered into during employment). 
 81. See Matt Marx, Good Work if You Can Get It . . . Again: Non-Compete Agreements, “Occupational 
Detours,” and Attainment (July 21, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1456748 (finding, based on field data from interviews and a survey, that individuals 
seek to avoid violating post-employment restraints by taking “occupational detours”). 
 82. Samila & Sorensen, supra note 19, at 428. 
 83. Gomulkiewicz, supra note 34, at 253–54; see also Bishara, supra note 71, at 306 (“[K]nowledge 
transfer from departing employees to other firms is, by design, inhibited by covenant not to compete 
enforcement. Knowledge spillover is thus less likely to happen in that manner because when employees are 
mobile and move to other firms they take tacit information with them, but by definition noncompetes limit 
mobility.” (footnote omitted)).  
April 2021] NONCOMPETES & POST-EMPLOYMENT RESTRAINTS 1197 
limiting CNCs contend that these “information spillovers” play an important 
role in stimulating innovation, particularly in high-technology industries.84 
Fourth, some scholars have highlighted the negative impact of CNCs on 
workers’ autonomy and dignitary interests. As Harlan Blake explained in his 
seminal 1960 article on noncompetes, “[e]very postemployment restraint, for 
whatever reason imposed, has inevitable effects which in some degree oppose 
commonly shared values. In view of our feeling that a man should not be able to 
barter away his personal freedom, even this small degree of servitude is 
distasteful.”85 Although these concerns are not prominent in the economic 
literature, some have argued that employees’ autonomy and freedom should be 
more strongly considered in the normative debate regarding CNCs.86 
C. EXISTING EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON NONCOMPETES 
This Subpart summarizes the methodology and results from a number of 
empirical studies of CNCs and other post-employment restrictive covenants. It 
is not intended to provide a complete report of all empirical research in this 
field,87 but instead to highlight the most relevant studies conducted to date, their 
key findings, and some of their limitations.88 
 
 84. LOBEL, supra note 16, at 39–40, 95–97; Amir & Lobel, supra note 66, at 856–61; Gilson, supra note 
15, at 579, 603–08. 
 85. Blake, supra note 12, at 650. 
 86. See Moffat, supra note 17, at 911 (“While the discussion of the efficiency implications is quite robust 
in the literature, the personal autonomy and dignitary concerns are often treated in . . . parenthetical fashion.”). 
 87. Most notably, it does not include empirical studies in the economic and business literature that focus 
on the impact of differential enforcement of CNCs between states on numerous issues, including 
entrepreneurship, employee mobility, firm performance, capital investment, and employee training and wages. 
For a more detailed summary of this scholarship, see generally Bishara & Starr, supra note 23, at 523–34. 
 88. For a comprehensive list of the existing empirical literature regarding CNCs through 2016, see 
generally Bishara & Starr, supra note 23 (identifying twenty-four empirical studies). Empirical studies that at 
least partially involve CNCs that postdate the Bishara & Starr article include: Daniel Aobdia, Employee Mobility, 
Noncompete Agreements, Product-Market Competition, and Company Disclosure, 23 REV. ACCOUNTING STUD. 
296 (2018); Thor Berger & Carl Benedikt Frey, Regional Technological Dynamism and Noncompete Clauses: 
Evidence from a Natural Experiment, 57 J. REG’L SCI. 655 (2017); Sarath Sanga, Incomplete Contracts: An 
Empirical Approach, 34 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 650 (2018); David P. Twomey, The Developing Law of Employee 
Non-Competition Agreements: Correcting Abuses; Making Adjustment to Enhance Economic Growth, 50 BUS. 
L. REV. 87 (2017); Desheng Yin, Iftekhar Hasan, Nada Kobeissi & Haizhi Wang, Enforceability of 
Noncompetition Agreements and Firm Innovation: Does State Regulation Matter?, 19 INNOVATION: MGMT., 
POL’Y & PRAC. 270 (2017); Smriti Anand, Iftekhar Hasan, Priyanka Sharma & Haizhi Wang, Enforceability of 
Non-Complete Agreements: When Does State Stifle Productivity? (Bank of Fin. Rsch., Discussion Paper No. 
24/2017, 2017) https://ssrn.com/abstract=3022475; Jessica S. Jeffers, The Impact of Restricting Labor Mobility 
on Corporate Investment and Entrepreneurship (Dec. 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/ 
abstract_id=3040393; Omesh Kini, Ryan Wiliams & Sirui Yin, CEO Noncompete Agreements, Job Risk, and 
Compensation, REV. FIN. STUD. (forthcoming 2021); Michael Lipsitz, The Costs and Benefits of Noncompete 
Agreements (2017) (Ph.D. dissertation, Boston University), https://hdl.handle.net/2144/27309; Starr et al., supra 
note 2; Evan Starr, Justin Frake & Rajshree Agarwal, Mobility Constraint Externalities, 30 ORG. SCI. 961 (2019). 
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1. Litigation Studies 
Two early empirical studies relied on reported appellate court decisions 
regarding CNCs. In 1990, Peter J. Whitmore reviewed a sample of 105 court 
opinions from the years 1966–1968 and 1986–1988, representing past and then-
present judicial enforcement of CNCs, respectively,89 and then handed coded 
these cases for over thirty potential factors that may influence judicial decision-
making.90 Descriptively, Whitmore’s study reported courts enforced CNCs 
slightly over half of the time in both decades,91 but that the duration (time length) 
of enforceable CNCs decreased over time.92 Specifically, Whitmore found that 
nearly all (94%) of CNCs contained some form of time restriction, but the 
average length of enforced CNCs was 21 months in the 1980s, compared to 27 
months in the 1960s.93 In addition, Whitmore found that nearly all (94%) CNCs 
contained some geographic and/or activity restraint,94 but that the number of 
CNCs containing a geographic limitation decreased over time,95 while the 
frequency of activity limitations had increased.96 Whitmore also found that 
courts were much more likely to enforce CNCs over both time periods when the 
employee had access to and/or used confidential customers lists or trade secrets 
in his or her subsequent employment.97 
A decade later, Helen LaVan randomly sampled 104 litigated cases in 
federal and state court involving noncompete agreements litigated in the 1980s 
and 1990s.98 From this group of cases, LaVan found that CNCs involved 
managers 25% of the time, sales personnel 31% of the time, and other 
professionals 37% of the time.99 Nearly a quarter (23.7%) of the sampled CNC 
cases involved trade secrets, with 14.2% also involving confidential business 
 
 89. Whitmore, supra note 24, at 494 n.67; see also id. app. A, at 528–32 (listing sampled cases). 
 90. Id. at 494–95; see also id. app. B, at 533 (listing variables). 
 91. Id. at 499 tbl.1 (reporting an overall enforcement rate of 58% for the 1960s cases and 55% for the 
1980s). 
 92. Id. at 500–01. 
 93. Id. at 501. It is unclear why Whitmore’s study reported mean (average) duration of CNCs rather than 
the median; the median is typically preferred as a descriptive statistic because it is more resistant to outliers. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See id. at 509 tbl.7 (reporting that 45% of CNCs in the decisions from the 1960s contained a geographic 
limitation compared to 26% of CNCs in the decisions from the 1980s). The study also found that the average 
mileage restriction in CNCs decreased between the 1960s and 1980s as well. See id. at 511 tbl.9 (finding that 
the average geographic restriction of CNCs was 70.6 miles in the decisions from the 1960s versus 45.0 miles in 
the decisions from the 1980s). 
 96. See id. at 509 tbl.7 (reporting that 39% of CNCs in the 1960s contained an activity limitation compared 
to 50% in the 1980s). 
 97. Id. at 503 tbl.2, 508 tbls.5 & 6. 
 98. Helen LaVan, A Logit Model to Predict the Enforceability of Noncompete Agreements, 12 EMP. RESP. 
& RTS. J. 219, 225 (2000). Although not entirely clear from the article, it appears that this random sample was 
drawn from a larger pool of 411 court opinions cited, discussed, or reported in Volumes 1–14 (1985 to 1998) of 
the Bureau of National Affairs (BNA) looseleaf publication Individual Employee Rights Manual. See id. at 219, 
225, 234. Approximately 30% of these cases were in federal court (both district and appellate), and the remaining 
amount (70%) were in state court. Id. at 227 tbl.II.  
 99. Id. at 227 tbl.II. Another 1% were classified as CNCs involving entertainers. Id. 
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information.100 This study also reported that in slightly over half of the cases 
(54.5%), courts found the CNC’s geographic limitation to be reasonable, 
although it did not specify what these limitations were.101 Similarly, LaVan 
reported that courts found activity restrictions in nearly two-thirds of the 
sampled CNCs (63.7%) to be reasonable, but the article did not describe the 
scope of these restrictions.102 
2. Studies of Specific Types of Employees 
A number of empirical studies have examined CNCs covering specific 
types of employees. Several of these have looked at employment agreements of 
high-ranking corporate executives of publicly-traded companies, whose 
contracts are publicly available in SEC filings.103 In a 2006 article, Stewart 
Schwab and Randall Thomas examined a sample of 375 employment contracts 
for Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) at the 1500 largest public corporations, 
including whether these contracts included CNCs.104 They found that about two-
thirds (67.5%) of sampled CEO employment contracts contained CNCs, most of 
which were either for one (21.33%) or two (31.47%) years in length.105  
In another study, Mark Garmaise looked at a random sample of SEC filings 
for 500 large, publicly traded firms from between 1992 and 2004, finding 
evidence that over 70% of these firms had CNCs with their top executives.106 
Somewhat surprisingly, this study also found that a majority (58%) of California 
firms in the sample reported using CNCs,107 even though these agreements are 
usually unenforceable under California law.108 Garmaise also developed a 12-
factor scale to assess the strength of state enforcement of noncompetes (the 
“non-competition enforcement index”).109 Based on this scale, Garmaise found 
that increased state enforcement of CNCs “reduces executive mobility” and 
“results in lower executive compensation.”110 
In perhaps the most detailed study of actual employment agreements 
containing post-employment restraints to date, Norman Bishara, Kenneth 
Martin, and Randall Thomas analyzed CEO employment contracts for a random 
sample 500 S&P 1500 companies between 1996 and 2010.111 They then hand 
 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. See Bishara et al., supra note 1, at 3 (“[P]ublic companies must disclose their CEOs’ employment 
contracts.”). 
 104. Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of CEO Employment Contracts: What 
Do Top Executives Bargain For?, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 231, 232–34 (2006). 
 105. Id. at 254–55, 255 tbl.9. 
 106. Garmaise, supra note 71, at 388, 396. 
 107. Id. at 396. 
 108. See supra notes 48–51 and accompanying text. 
 109. Garmaise, supra note 71, app. A.6. Barnett and Sichelman have critiqued Garmaise’s non-competition 
enforcement index as problematic for several reasons. See Barnett & Sichelman, supra note 13, at 1010–17.  
 110. Garmaise, supra note 71, at 376–79. 
 111. Bishara et al., supra note 1, at 3. 
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coded each CEO employment agreement (874 in total) for a wide variety of 
information, including the frequency, scope, and duration of CNCs, NSAs, and 
NDAs in these contracts.112 Bishara et al. report that over 70% of CEO contracts 
in their sample contained post-employment CNCs,113 but that CNCs were less 
frequently used if the firm’s primary location was in California.114 Examining 
CNCs in more detail, they found that a majority of CEOs’ CNCs lasted two years 
or less after their employment ended,115 and that the geographic scope of these 
CNCs was quite broad—they most commonly applied either anywhere the 
employer operated or did business (38.3%) or had no express geographic limit 
(41.8%).116 In addition, three-quarters (75.6%) of these agreements contained 
NSAs prohibiting CEOs from soliciting employees of their former firm, and a 
slight majority (50.8%) prohibited CEOs from soliciting customers of their 
former firm.117 Finally, the vast majority of CEO contracts (87.1%) contained 
an NDA, and nearly all contracts that had a CNC also had an NDA (93.4%).118 
Two other studies dealt with surveys of other groups of high-skill groups 
of workers. In conjunction with the Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers (IEEE), Matt Marx surveyed over 1000 engineers across a variety of 
industries.119 Almost half of respondents (46.8%) indicated that they had been 
asked by an employer to sign a CNC; of these, nearly all (92.6%) agreed to do 
so.120 In addition, Marx reported that over three-quarters (77.14%) of engineers 
who signed a CNC did so on or before their first day of employment with the 
firm.121 
In a recent paper, Kurt Lavetti, Carol Simon, and William D. White 
surveyed nearly 2000 primary care physicians in five states.122 They found that 
nearly half (45%) of primary care physicians in group practices are bound by 
CNCs.123 The percentage of physicians covered by state varied significantly, 
 
 112. See id. at 24–27 (describing the study’s methodology). 
 113. Id. at 29 tbl.3.  
 114. See id. at 34 tbl.6 (finding that CNCs were found in 84% of CEO contracts where the firm’s primary 
location was outside of California, compared to 62.4% where the firm’s primary location was inside California, 
and that this difference is statistically significant). 
 115. See id. at 36–37, 36 tbl.7 (reporting that 32.8% of CEOs had a CNC of one year or less, and another 
31.8% had a CNC greater than one year but no more than two years; 7% were for greater than two years; and 
the remaining 28.5% did not specify a length or had another triggering event for the CNC’s termination). 
 116. See id. at 41 tbl.9 (reporting also that another 5.3% of CNCs expressly applied worldwide, while 10.2% 
covered only the entire United States and another 4.3% covered only part of the United States). 
 117. Id. at 38. 
 118. Id. at 42. 
 119. Matt Marx, The Firm Strikes Back: Non-Compete Agreements and the Mobility of Technical 
Professionals, 76 AM. SOCIO. REV. 695, 701–02 (2011). The survey was sent to 5000 randomly-selected IEEE 
members, with a response rate of 20.6% (1029 surveys). Id. at 702. 
 120. Id. at 702 tbl.1. 
 121. Id. at 706 tbl.4. 
 122. Lavetti et al., supra note 24. The survey in question is the Physician Perspectives on Patient Care 
Survey, which the authors conducted in 2007. Id. at 1040. The states where primary care physicians were 
surveyed are: California, Georgia, Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Texas. Id.  
 123. Id. at 1030. 
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from a low of 31.3% in California to a high of 60.6% in Pennsylvania.124 The 
former figure is interesting in light of the fact that CNCs are generally 
unenforceable in California.125 In addition, primary care physicians who worked 
at group practices of more than a handful of doctors were more likely to be 
covered by CNCs.126 Group practices that used CNCs were more likely to 
generate greater revenue per physician and spend more hours on patient care per 
week.127 Finally, Lavetti et al. found that physicians covered by CNCs had 
longer tenures with a practice group, and thus were less likely to change 
positions, compared to those without CNCs.128 
3. Online Surveys 
A recent large-scale online survey of American workers provides 
additional information regarding the frequency and scope of CNCs and other 
post-employment restraints on competition. In a forthcoming article, Evan Starr, 
J.J. Prescott, and Norman Bishara report the results of a survey of labor force 
participants age 18 to 75 who reported working in the private sector (for profit 
or non-profit organizations) or were an employee of a public healthcare 
system.129 After inviting over 700,000 participants, the authors conducted an 
extensive audit of completed survey responses to filter out potentially 
duplicative and unreliable surveys, resulting in a final sample of 11,505 
respondents.130 From these responses, they found an estimated 18% of workers 
were bound by a CNC.131 Consistent with expectations, CNCs were more 
frequent among well-educated workers132 and highly-compensated 
employees,133 but approximately a third (35%) of respondents who lacked an 
undergraduate (bachelor’s) degree reported being covered by a CNC at some 
point in the past, as well as a third (33%) of workers who made under $40,000 
per year.134 Similarly, CNCs were more common in certain highly-skilled 
 
 124. Id. at 1042 tbl.1. 
 125. See supra notes 48–51 and accompanying text. 
 126. Specifically, practices with 2–3 physicians used CNCs less than a third of the time (31.3%), while 
practices of 4–499 physicians used CNCs between 45–50% of the time. Lavetti et al., supra note 24, at 1056 
tbl.8. 
 127. See id. at 1057 tbl.9. 
 128. Id. at 1058–61. 
 129. Starr et al., supra note 2, at 3. 
 130. Id. at 3–4; see also Prescott et al., supra note 23, at 406–55 (describing authors’ methodology in detail). 
 131. Starr et al., supra note 2, at 5. Another recent survey of employers concluded that between 27.8% and 
46.5% of private sector workers are subject to a noncompete. Alexander J.S. Colvin & Heidi Shierholz, 
Noncompete Agreements: Ubiquitous, Harmful to Wages and to Competition, and Part of a Growing Trend of 
Employers Requiring Workers to Sign Away Their Rights, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Dec. 10, 2019), 
https://www.epi.org/publication/noncompete-agreements. 
 132. See Starr et al., supra note 2, at 6, 22 fig.3 (reporting that 25% of surveyed persons with a bachelor’s 
degree and 39% of persons with a professional degree were currently subject to a CNC, compared to under 15% 
for high school graduates and persons with less than two years of college). 
 133. Id. at 6, 22 fig.4 (reporting that at least 32% of surveyed persons making in excess of $100,000 per 
year were currently subject to a CNC, compared to 15% or less for those making less than $40,000). 
 134. Id. at 6. 
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occupations such as engineering, computer science, and management.135 Persons 
who worked with trade secret information were significantly more likely to be 
bound by a CNCs.136 In another paper based upon the same survey data, the 
authors find that CNCs are also associated with decreased labor mobility.137 
In a recent policy paper, Alan Krueger and Eric Posner reported the results 
of an online survey of 795 employees.138 Based on a weighted sample, they 
found that 15.5% of workers were currently covered by a CNC. They also found 
that higher-income workers were more likely to be subject to a CNC.139 But in 
contrast to Starr et al., Krueger and Posner found that the percentage of workers 
bound by a CNC was slightly higher for those with a high school degree or less 
than for workers with at least some college education.140 
4. Experimental Studies 
A number of experimental studies have also attempted to assess the impact 
of CNCs on employee mobility and performance. Some of these studies involve 
interactions with voluntary participants in a controlled environment, while 
another cluster of articles has studied the impact of a single state’s apparently 
accidental change regarding the enforceability of CNCs. 
In one frequently-cited study, Matt Marx, Deborah Strumsky, and Lee 
Fleming exploited a “natural experiment”141 involving Michigan’s Antitrust 
Reform Act, which the authors asserted inadvertently repealed the state’s 
statutory bar on enforcing noncompete agreements.142 Using a difference-in-
 
 135. Id. at 7, 23 fig.5. 
 136. Id. at 7, 25 fig.7. 
 137. See Evan Starr, J.J. Prescott & Norman Bishara, The Behavioral Effects of (Unenforceable) Contracts, 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 34–35), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=2858637. 
 138. ALAN B. KRUEGER & ERIC A. POSNER, HAMILTON PROJECT, A PROPOSAL FOR PROTECTING LOW-
INCOME WORKERS FROM MONOPSONY AND COLLUSION 7–8 (2018), https://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/ 
files/protecting_low_income_workers_from_monopsony_collusion_krueger_posner_pp.pdf. 
 139. Id. at 8. 
 140. See id. (reporting that 17.5% of workers with a high school education or less were bound by CNCs, 
compared to 14.6% for those who had at least some college education).  
 141. A natural experiment in economics is a “serendipitous situation in which persons are assigned randomly 
to a treatment (or multiple treatments) and a control group, and outcomes are analysed for the purposes” of 
testing a hypothesis. J. DiNardo, Natural Experiments and Quasi-Natural Experiments, in 5 THE NEW 
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 9235, 9325–26 (3d ed. 2018). See generally THAD DUNNING, NATURAL 
EXPERIMENTS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: A DESIGN-BASED APPROACH (2012) (providing an overview of the 
topic). 
 142. See Marx et al., The Michigan Non-Compete Experiment, supra note 19, at 877 (citing Act 274, 
Michigan Antitrust Reform Act of 1984 (codified at MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 445.771–445.788 (2021))). The 
Michigan Antitrust Reform Act (MARA) was based on the Uniform State Antitrust Act promulgated by the 
National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws. See 2 ROCKY C. TSAI & KATHLEEN W. BRADISH, 
STATE ANTITRUST PRACTICE & STATUTES (5th ed. 2014). However, in enacting MARA, the Michigan legislature 
repealed MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.761 (enacted in 1905), which provided that “[a]ll agreements and contracts 
by which any person . . . agrees not to engage in any avocation or employment . . . are hereby declared to be 
against public policy and illegal and void.” Marx et al., The Michigan Non-Compete Experiment, supra note 19, 
at 877 (omissions in original). Based on the lack of contemporaneous commentary in the legislative history and 
law journal articles shortly after MARA’s passage, Marx et al. conclude that MARA “inadvertently repealed” 
this statutory ban on enforcing CNCs. Id.  
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differences approach, they compared the job mobility of patented inventors in 
Michigan before and after this change with inventors in ten other states that did 
not enforce CNCs.143 Marx et al. found that the intra-state job mobility of 
inventors in Michigan fell 8.1% once CNCs became enforceable,144 with highly-
skilled inventors in Michigan suffering an even greater decline of 16.2%.145 In a 
follow-up study, Marx, Fleming, and Jasjit Singh found that the rate of interstate 
emigration of patented inventors in Michigan grew faster compared to other non-
enforcing states in the decade following Michigan’s legislative change,146 
leading the authors to conclude that CNCs “encourage the migration of [highly 
skilled] workers from states where such contracts are enforceable to states where 
they are not.”147  
However, Jonathan Barnett and Ted Sichelman have critiqued numerous 
aspects of the Marx et al. studies, including the incompleteness of the patent 
record for tracking inventor mobility, the selection of other (control) states as 
non-enforcing jurisdictions for CNCs, and the failure to control for the inclusion 
of a “savings clause” in Michigan’s antitrust legislation which provided that pre-
existing CNCs remained enforceable after its enactment.148 Further muddying 
the waters is a recent paper that employed a similar difference-in-differences 
methodology involving Michigan and found that enforcement of CNCs “had a 
positive and significant effect on the startup job creation rate” and “little to no 
effect on the entry rate of new firms.”149  
Experimental studies also have reached mixed results regarding the impact 
of CNCs on employees’ motivation and work performance. In a 2013 study, On 
Amir and Orly Lobel assessed the effects of postemployment restrictions on task 
performance by conducting an online experiment involving over 1000 
subjects.150 Participants were randomly assigned different types of work 
 
 143. Marx et al., The Michigan Non-Compete Experiment, supra note 19, at 879–82. In particular, Marx et 
al. used matching algorithms for inventors in the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) patent file, 
which contained data on all U.S. patents issued from 1975 to 2000, supplemented by additional data collected 
by the authors. Id. at 879 (citing Bronwyn H. Hall, Adam B. Jaffe & Manuel Trajtenberg, The NBER Patent 
Citations Data File: Lessons, Insights and Methodological Tools (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper 
No. 8498, 2001)). 
 144. Id. at 884–86. This figure excluded Michigan inventors who worked for automobile firms. Id. at 887. 
 145. Marx et al. defined highly-skilled inventors as those that were one standard deviation above the mean 
in terms of patenting. Id. at 886. 
 146. See Marx et al., Regional Disadvantage?, supra note 19, at 397, 399 tbl.2 (finding that the rate of 
emigration of patented inventors in Michigan grew from 0.24% in 1975–1984 to 0.32% from 1985–1996, 
compared to patented inventors in the control group of states that did not enforce noncompetes, which decreased 
from 0.20% to 0.13% during these time periods). 
 147. Id. at 403.  
 148. See Barnett & Sichelman, supra note 13, at 1017–18, 1020–23; Barnett & Sichelman, supra note 71, 
at 73–83. 
 149. See Gerald Carlino, Do Non-Compete Covenants Influence State Startup Activity? Evidence from the 
Michigan Experiment (Fed. Rsrv. Bank of Phila., Working Paper No. 17-30, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3041843.  
 150. Amir & Lobel, supra note 66, at 837. These subjects were intended to simulate a high-skilled 
marketplace—99% had an undergraduate degree, while 43% also had a graduate degree. Id. at 852. 
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assignments requiring either pure effort or more creative production.151 In 
addition, each participant was randomly assigned one of three conditions: an 
absolute noncompete that would preclude the subject from completing the same 
kind of task in future assignments; a partial noncompete where an employee 
could opt out of the restriction against similar work by paying back the training 
costs to the employer; and no contractual restriction.152 The results from this 
experiment found that subjects with a CNC had a higher rate of failing to 
complete the assigned work.153 In addition, participants with a CNC were twice 
as likely to make mistakes in the effort-based task.154 Based on these results, 
Amir and Lobel contend that “certain postemployment contractual restrictions 
may negatively impact motivation and performance” and “discourage 
employees to invest in their work performance.”155 
In a 2016 article, Guido Buenstorf, Christoph Engel, Sven Fisher, and 
Werner Gueth reported the results of an experiment intended to simulate a 
principal-agent relationship subject to different noncompete restrictions.156 Two 
of the conditions involved a CNC, while a third (baseline) condition lacked any 
restraint.157 The study participants were 256 university students.158 Contrary to 
the authors’ hypotheses, the results of the experiment showed that “imposing a 
non-compete clause has no significant effect on effort.”159 From this, Buenstorf 
et al. concluded that “our experimental results do not suggest that adverse 
effects” on employee motivation from CNCs “are a substantial concern” in most 
cases.160 
5. Key Findings and Limitations of Prior Studies 
Several inferences may be drawn regarding the frequency, scope, and 
potential impact of CNCs from the existing body of empirical research. First, it 
appears that CNCs are widely used by employers, particularly for highly-skilled, 
highly-compensated employees. However, there is also evidence suggesting that 
a substantial number of lower-wage workers are subject to CNCs as well. 
Second, it appears that workers who deal with trade secret and other confidential 
business information are more likely to be covered by a CNC. Third, it appears 
 
 151. Id.  
 152. Id.  
 153. See id. at 854 (finding a 24% increase in dropout rates of participants subject to a noncompete). 
 154. Id. at 855. In contrast, subjects had a similar performance level in terms of error rates for the more 
creative assignment. Id.  
 155. Id. at 863; see also id. at 866 (“The results of this experimental study suggest that, under certain 
conditions, postemployment restrictions will suppress motivation to perform as well as degrade performance 
itself.”). 
 156. Guido Buenstorf, Christoph Engel, Sven Fischer & Werner Gueth, Non-Compete Clauses, Employee 
Effort and Spin-Off Entrepreneurship: A Laboratory Experiment, 45 RSCH. POL’Y 2113, 2114 (2016). 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 2117. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 2121. 
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that many CNCs are limited in duration, often for two years or less. Fourth, some 
CNCs are also expressly limited by geographic scope and/or activity restrictions, 
but it is not clear how often or to what extent these limitations occur. Fifth, even 
though CNCs are less common among workers and firms in California—not 
surprising in light of that state’s general non-enforcement policy regarding 
CNCs—they are not entirely absent. Finally, using a variety of methodologies, 
a number of the studies conclude that CNCs significantly inhibit employee 
mobility. 
While valuable, these empirical studies all have limitations that suggest a 
degree of caution is warranted in assessing their findings and their potential 
value for policymakers.161 First, many of these studies examine only a specific 
type of employer—such as large, publicly-traded firms—or a specific type of 
employee—usually highly educated and highly compensated workers, like 
CEOs and doctors—that limits the ability to extrapolate their findings to the 
more diverse American business and labor markets.162  
Second, only a handful of these studies involve the review of actual 
employment contracts (or other legally-binding documents, such as retention or 
bonus agreements) that may contain CNCs and other post-employment 
restrictions.163 This is not surprising because employment contracts are 
generally not publicly available,164 so most researchers have used other data 
sources, such as survey information, instead. But these alternative sources 
(which are essentially proxies) also have limits. For example, in the Starr et al. 
survey, nearly 30% of all respondents were unable to give a “yes” or “no” answer 
to the basic, threshold question of whether they had ever agreed to a CNC, with 
most of these (24.8%) indicating that they had never heard of CNCs.165 As a 
result, the accuracy of self-reported information to the more detailed questions 
in this survey may also be in question. In addition, even though online surveys 
are now widely used in numerous academic disciplines due to their speed and 
relatively low cost, they may have their own biases and limitations compared to 
more traditional survey methods like telephone surveys or in-person interviews, 
including the representativeness of the responding population.166  
 
 161. See Barnett & Sichelman, supra note 13, at 964 (contending that “these [empirical] studies suffer from 
significant methodological limitations, deliver statistically weak results, and do not provide compelling support 
for the view that banning noncompetes promotes innovation”). 
 162. See Barnett & Sichelman, supra note 71, at 5 (“Some studies focus on specific types of personnel, such 
as top executives, or types of firms, such as very large companies, that limit their applicability.”). 
 163. See Bishara et al., supra note 1, at 24 (“Since employment contracts are not generally publicly 
available, researchers have been unable to examine [them] empirically.”).  
 164. See id. at 3 (“[M]ost employment contracts are not publicly available, leaving researchers to speculate 
on the prevalence of these restrictions and their contents.”). 
 165. Starr et al., supra note 2, at 5. 
 166. See Corina Cornesse & Michael Bosnjak, Is There an Association Between Survey Characteristics and 
Representativeness? A Meta-Analysis, 12 SURVEY RSCH. METHODS 1, 9 (2018) (finding web-based surveys to 
be less representative than other single-mode survey methods); see also Dan Kahan, What’s a “Valid” Sample? 
Problems with Mechanical Turk Study Samples, Part 1, CULTURAL COGNITION PROJECT (July 8, 2013, 9:34 
AM), http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2013/7/8/whats-a-valid-sample-problems-with-mechanical-turk-
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Third, empirical studies of CNCs based on court decisions are subject to 
the well-known selection effect. “[T]he selection effect refers to the proposition 
that the selection of tried cases is not a random sample of the mass of underlying 
cases” because “[c]ases only go to trial when the parties substantially disagree 
on the predicted outcome.”167 Thus, “the disputes selected for litigation . . . will 
constitute neither a random nor a representative sample.”168 
Fourth, the underlying sources of information in several of the studies—
particularly those relying on litigated cases—are now dated and thus may not be 
representative of current law and practice regarding CNCs. In particular, the 
Whitmore study relies in part on court opinions that are now fifty years old,169 
and the LaVan study uses cases dating back over thirty years as well.170 But even 
some of the more recent studies that use survey evidence may be less-than-
timely. For instance, Lavetti et al. rely on a 2007 survey of primary care 
physicians,171 but much has changed in both the practice and business of 
medicine since then, most notably the enactment, implementation, and attempts 
to repeal the Affordable Care Act.172 
Fifth, nearly all of these existing empirical studies focus primarily or 
exclusively on CNCs, ignoring other potential contractual limits on post-
employment competition, such as NSAs that preclude the recruitment of an 
employer’s clients or employees and NDAs that prohibit the disclosure of trade 
secret and other confidential information after termination of employment.173 As 
a result, these studies only paint at best a partial picture regarding employers’ 
use of contract law to limit post-employment competition from their former 
employees. 
 
study-sam.html (criticizing the validity of surveys using Amazon Mechanical Turk for “the study of how cultural 
or ideological commitments” influence cognitive processes); Dan Kahan, Fooled Twice, Shame on Who? 
Problems with Mechanical Turk Study Samples, Part 2, CULTURAL COGNITION PROJECT (July 10, 2013, 9:30 
AM), http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2013/7/10/fooled-twice-shame-on-who-problems-with-
mechanical-turk-stud.html (elaborating further on the alleged invalidity of Mechanical Turk samples “for the 
study of culturally or ideologically” motivated reasoning due to selection bias, prior repeated exposure to study 
measures, and possible misrepresentation of nationality). But see Scott Clifford, Ryan M. Jewell & Philip D. 
Waggoner, Are Samples Drawn from Mechanical Turk Valid for Research on Political Ideology?, RSCH. & POL., 
Dec. 2015, at 1, 7 (“Our study . . . provides evidence for the validity of samples drawn from [Mechanical Turk] 
for psychological research on ideology.”).  
 167. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending Empiricism, 77 
CORNELL L. REV. 1124, 1129 (1992) (quoting Theodore Eisenberg, Testing the Selection Effect: A New 
Theoretical Framework with Empirical Tests, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 337, 337 (1990)). The seminal article on the 
“selection effect” is George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL. 
STUD. 1 (1984). 
 168. Priest & Klein, supra note 167, at 4. 
 169. See supra notes 89–97 and accompanying text. 
 170. See supra notes 98–102 and accompanying text. 
 171. See supra notes 24, 122–128 and accompanying text. 
 172. See generally Neda Laiteerapong & Elbert S. Huang, The Pace of Change in Medical Practice and 
Health Policy: Collision or Coexistence?, 30 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 848 (2015) (describing the impact of the 
Affordable Care Act of 2010 on primary care physicians and their practices). 
 173. Bishara et al. is a notable counterexample; this study contains substantial data on both NSAs and NDAs. 
See Bishara et al., supra note 1. 
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In sum, despite the valuable and important work done by legal, business, 
and economics scholars so far, there is room for additional empirical research 
on CNCs and other post-employment restraints on competition, especially those 
that use actual employment agreements from a broad cross-section of the 
American workforce as data sources. 
II.  METHODOLOGY 
This Part first details the research objectives of this empirical project. It 
then explains the study design and data collection process. Finally, it describes 
some potential limitations of the methodology described herein. 
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Rather than starting with the articulation of formal hypotheses, this project 
began by recognizing that the existing empirical literature on CNCs lacked a 
large-scale study of actual employment contracts that covered more than just a 
single, narrow class of employees (like CEOs).174 Relatedly, there has been 
relatively little recent empirical scholarship on what types of firms and workers 
use CNCs, as well as their scope.175 Further, the literature is overwhelmingly 
focused on one type of post-employment restraint—CNCs—and has largely 
ignored other contractual limits on competition that employers may use, such as 
NSAs and NDAs.176  
One as-yet-untapped source of employment contracts that could help shed 
light on these questions is federal trade secret litigation. Trade secret litigation 
was likely to be a fertile source of CNCs because employers may assert both 
CNCs and trade secrecy claims to protect their important business 
information.177 Indeed, in a previous study of trade secret litigation in federal 
court under the recently-enacted Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA), the Author 
helped code whether complaints in these cases included or referred to a 
noncompete agreement.178 
 
 174. See Bishara & Starr, supra note 23, at 534 (“The literature review makes clear that studies with the 
actual use of noncompetes are limited . . . .”); see also LEE EPSTEIN & ANDREW D. MARTIN, AN INTRODUCTION 
TO EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH 28 (2014) (noting that one “characteristic of a good research question is that it 
seeks to engage the existing literature,” including “spott[ing] a gap” in existing studies). 
 175. See Bishara & Starr, supra note 23, at 535–36 (“[A]t the most basic level . . . what is missing from the 
literature is an understanding of what types of firms use noncompetes, what types of workers sign noncompetes, 
what the conditions of the noncompete are, and why and when such noncompetes are used.”). 
 176. See id. at 536 (“[F]or states considering whether they should make the use of noncompetes illegal, it is 
important to know if firms . . . simply substitute other protection methods . . . .”). 
 177. See, e.g., Norman D. Bishara & David Orozco, Using the Resource-Based Theory to Determine 
Covenant Not to Compete Legitimacy, 87 IND. L.J. 979, 997–98 (2012) (noting a CNC claim may “be used in 
conjunction with other theories of knowledge ownership” such as “related trade secret . . . litigation against a 
former employee-owner”). 
 178. David S. Levine & Christopher B. Seaman, The DTSA at One: An Empirical Study of the First Year of 
Litigation Under the Defend Trade Secrets Act, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 105, 133, 153 & n.290 (2018).  
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In addition, after a preliminary review of the literature and data, one 
hypothesis that emerged was the “so-called ‘California effect.’”179 Specifically, 
scholars have assumed CNCs would be much less common in employment 
contracts for employees and firms located in California because CNCs are 
generally not enforceable there.180 Prior empirical studies have found California 
residents are less likely to be covered by a CNC, but a substantial number of 
Californians nonetheless report having signed one.181  
B. STUDY DESIGN AND DATA COLLECTION 
An original dataset was created for this study.182 The starting point for data 
collection was the Author’s prior dataset of federal district court cases that 
involved a trade secret misappropriation claim in the one-year period following 
the DTSA’s enactment in May 2016 (“DTSA Dataset”).183 As part of that 
study,184 each case in the DTSA Dataset was hand coded for a variety of basic 
case information,185 including the identity of the litigating parties,186 the date 
when the first pleading asserting a DTSA claim was filed,187 the district court 
where the case was filed,188 the case’s docket number,189 and the assigned 
judge.190 To supplement this previously-collected data, the Author also searched 
the Lex Machina database for DTSA cases filed on or before May 11, 2017 (the 
one-year anniversary of the DTSA’s enactment).191 A total of 689 DTSA cases 
were identified through these methods. 
 
 179. Bishara et al., supra note 1, at 15. 
 180. See id. at 48 (noting that employment contracts for firms located in California “are much less likely to 
include noncompete clauses, as California state courts will not enforce the provisions”). 
 181. See supra notes 107, 124 and accompanying text. 
 182. In accordance with scholarly norms regarding empirical legal research, this dataset is being made 
publicly available upon the Article’s publication. See Robin Feldman, Mark A. Lemley, Jonathan S. Masur & 
Arti K. Rai, Open Letter on Ethical Norms in Intellectual Property Scholarship, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 339, 
348 (2016) (recommending that “data needed to replicate the results in a published empirical paper should be 
made accessible to other academics at the time the paper is published”). It will be available at the following 
website: http://christopherbseaman.com. 
 183. Levine & Seaman, supra note 178, at 124–25. We used a variety of sources to identify these cases, 
including full-text searches of court dockets in Bloomberg Law and searches of district court opinions in 
WestlawNext and Lexis Advance. Id. The full list of DTSA cases identified from these sources is available at 
http://www.dtsalitigation.com. 
 184. For more detail regarding coding of the DTSA Dataset, see id. at 125–33.  
 185. Variable names are listed in brackets in the following footnotes. 
 186. These were coded as two separate string (text) variables: [plaintiff] and [defendant]. If multiple 
plaintiffs or defendants were named, only the first named party was used for each variable. Levine & Seaman, 
supra note 178, at 125 nn.104–05. 
 187. This variable [date] was coded in the following format: MM/DD/YYYY. Id. at 125 n.106. 
 188. This variable [court] was coded using a three- or four-letter abbreviation consistent with the federal 
Public Access to Court Electronic Records system (“PACER”). Id. at 126 n.107. 
 189. This variable [docket] was coded in the following format: N:NN-CV-NNNNN (N is a number). Id. at 
126 n.108. 
 190. This was coded as a string variable: [judge]. Id. at 126 n.109. 
 191. LEX MACHINA, https://law.lexmachina.com (last visited Apr. 19, 2021). 
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In the initial phase of coding for this project, the pleadings in each DTSA 
case were reviewed to determine if they mentioned or referred to a CNC or NSA 
that applied to a current or former employee. The number of employees in each 
case who were allegedly covered by these post-employment restraints was also 
identified.192 In total, 335 out of 689 cases (49%) included a reference to a CNC 
or NSA, covering a total of 532 employees. 
Next, the online court docket was reviewed for these cases to locate the 
employment agreement or other document (such as a retention or bonus 
agreement) that contained the post-employment restraint(s).193 For most 
employees, the full employment agreement containing the CNC and/or NSA was 
available in the online court docket, often as an exhibit or attachment to the 
complaint itself.194 For employees where the agreement could not be located, 
information alleged in the complaint (or other relevant pleading) was used 
instead.195  
Each agreement was then hand coded for a variety of information.196 First, 
it was coded for whether it contained a CNC, which was defined as a prohibition 
on working for or being employed by a competing firm, or otherwise engaging 
in competition against the former employer, after termination of employment.197 
The length (duration) of the CNC198 and the geographic limit of the CNC, if any, 
was also coded.199 
Second, each agreement was coded for whether it included an NSA, which 
was defined as a prohibition on soliciting the former employer’s customers 
and/or employees.200 Many employment agreements with a CNC also contained 
an NSA, even though the language of the CNC in many cases would also 
preclude conduct prohibited by the NSA.201 Each agreement was also coded 
more granularly for whether the NSA prohibited soliciting customers or clients 
of the former employer,202 whether the NSA prohibiting soliciting other 
 
 192. This was coded as a numeric variable: [empno].  In the final dataset, a separate entry was created for 
each employee subject to a noncompete. 
 193. We used Bloomberg Law’s dockets feature to conduct this review. “We” in this context refers to the 
Author and his research assistants. 
 194. For 446 out of 532 employees (84%), the entire agreement was available. A hyperlink to each of these 
documents is contained in the following variable in the dataset: [noncomplete_link]. The agreement was only 
partially available for another 17 employees (3%), usually due to redaction of parts of the agreement.  
 195. This occurred for 69 out of the 532 employees (13%). 
 196. For more detail regarding the hand coding process, see infra notes 219–221 and accompanying text. 
 197. This was coded as a binary (dummy) variable: [cnc]. 
 198. This was coded as a numeric variable for the CNC’s duration in months after termination of 
employment: [cnc_time]. For example, a one-year CNC would be coded as 12.  
 199. This was coded as a categorical variable: [cnc_distance]. 
 200. This was coded as a binary variable: [nsa]. 
 201. Specifically, of the 351 employees subject to a CNC, 301 (86%) were also subject to an NSA.  
 202. This was coded as a binary variable: [nsa_customers]. 
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employees of the former employer (for example, a non-raiding clause),203 or 
both.204 Finally, the length (duration) of each NSA was coded.205 
Third, some additional information from the employment agreement was 
coded. This included the year that the agreement was entered into;206 the 
governing law specified in the agreement, if any;207 and whether the agreement 
contained an arbitration clause.208 The industry of the employer was also 
coded.209 
Finally, information about the employee(s) covered by the CNC and/or 
NSA was coded. In particular, both the complaint and the employment 
agreement was reviewed to determine the employee’s job title,210 as well as the 
employee’s base salary211 and eligibility for other compensation such as sales 
commissions, bonuses, and equity/stock incentive agreements,212 if available. 
C. LIMITATIONS 
Like virtually all empirical research, the methodology used in this study 
has limitations that could affect the results and implications discussed in the 
 
 203. This was coded as a binary variable: [nsa_employees]. 
 204. This was coded as a categorical variable, based upon information from the previous two variables: 
[nsa_detail]. 
 205. This was coded as two separate variables for the NSA’s duration in months after employment: 
[nsa_time_customers] for NSAs involving customers and [nsa_time_employees] for NSAs involving 
employees].  
 206. This was coded as a four-digit number: [doc_year]. If multiple employment agreements for a single 
employee contained a CNC and/or NSA, the most recent available agreement was used. 
 207. This was coded as a two-letter variable based on the U.S. Postal Service code for the relevant state: 
[law]. For example, “CA” was used if the agreement specified that California law would apply to any dispute. 
“XX” was used if no governing law was identified in the agreement or if information regarding the governing 
law was not available. “OT” was used if the agreement specified that foreign (non-U.S.) law applied. 
 208. This was coded as a binary variable: [arbitrate]. An employer may seek to enforce a CNC in arbitration 
if the employment agreement authorizes it to do so. See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, Between Rights and Contract: 
Arbitration Agreements and Non-Compete Covenants as a Hybrid Form of Employment Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 
379, 381 (2006) (noting that arbitration agreements for CNCs are “increasingly common, frequently litigated, 
and controversial”); see also Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C. v. Howard, 568 U.S. 17, 21–22 (2012) (per curiam) 
(overturning a state court decision that declined to submit a noncompete dispute to arbitration despite the 
existence of an arbitration clause in the employment agreement). 
 209. This was coded as a numeric variable based upon the employer’s North American Industry 
Classification System (NAICS) code: [industry]. The NAICS is the standard used by federal statistical agencies 
in classifying business establishments for the purposes of collecting, analyzing, and publishing statistical data 
regarding the U.S. economy. See OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, NORTH AMERICAN 
INDUSTRY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM (2017), https://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/2017NAICS/ 
2017_NAICS_Manual.pdf. 
 210. This was coded as a categorical variable: [job]. The following categories were used: President or Chief 
Executive Officer; Other Senior Management (for example, Vice President); Technical/Engineering Staff; 
Sales/Customer Service Staff; Owner/Former Owner; Other; Unknown. In addition, the job title of the employee 
(if available) was coded as a string variable: [job_title]. 
 211. This was coded as numeric variable: [salary]. For employees paid at an hourly rate, the annual salary 
was calculated by multiplying their hourly rate by forty hours per week, by fifty weeks per year. 
 212. This was coded as a binary variable: [othercomp]. 
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remainder of this Article.213 This Subpart discusses several potential limitations 
and the Author’s efforts to address them. 
First, this study is based upon information from litigation, which is subject 
to the well-known selection effect. As previously mentioned, the cases that end 
up in litigation “constitute neither a random nor a representative sample . . . of 
all disputes.”214 One reason for this bias is that litigation is expensive; “[m]any 
disputes are resolved before a lawsuit is filed” because it is often more cost 
effective “to settle than to litigate.”215 In particular, this dataset is based on trade 
secret litigation, which can be quite expensive, even compared to other types of 
civil litigation in federal court.216 As a result, parties may select other methods, 
such as alternative dispute resolution, to resolve their grievances.217 
Furthermore, if the employment agreement provides for resolution of disputes 
through mandatory arbitration, these cases also typically will not be litigated and 
thus will not appear in the dataset.218  
Second, the number of employment agreements in the dataset is relatively 
small given the estimated frequency of CNCs in the American workforce. In 
other words, it is difficult to draw any definitive conclusions regarding millions 
 
 213. See Michael Heise, The Past, Present, and Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship: Judicial Decision 
Making and the New Empiricism, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 819, 849 (“Data, research design, and statistical methods 
frequently enforce limits on what can be properly inferred from the results of empirical 
studies. . . . Notwithstanding these inherent and structural limitations, empirical methodologies are well-
positioned to enhance and complement traditional legal scholarship.”). Under best practices, authors of empirical 
legal research “should discuss limitations on the validity and generalizability of [their] empirical findings.” 
Gregory Mitchell, Essay, Empirical Legal Scholarship as Scientific Dialogue, 83 N.C. L. REV. 167, 203 (2004). 
 214. Priest & Klein, supra note 167, at 4. It is worth noting that the Priest-Klein model is focused on 
empirical studies of outcomes (such as win rates) in litigation; as such, it defines the term “litigated” narrowly 
as only disputes where “a verdict is rendered.” Id. at 4–6. This study, in contrast, starts with a larger group of 
DTSA cases involving a CNC or NSA and is not limited only to cases that reached a resolution on the merits. 
 215. Robert H. Gertner, Asymmetric Information, Uncertainty, and Selection Bias in Litigation, 1993 U. 
CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 75, 75, 79; see also Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Models and Trial Outcomes in 
Civil Rights and Prisoner Cases, 77 GEO. L.J. 1567, 1571 (1989) (“Both sides can save the costs of litigation by 
settling [a] dispute.”). 
 216. See AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N, 2019 REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 68 (2019) (finding in a 
survey of IP attorneys that the median litigation cost for a trade secret case varied from $550,000 (if less than $1 
million was at risk) to over $7.5 million (if more than $25 million was at risk)). 
 217. See generally Steven Shavell, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic Analysis, 24 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1 (1995) (examining reasons why parties would choose alternative dispute resolution as opposed to trial); 
Scott H. Blackman & Rebecca M. McNeill, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Commercial Intellectual Property 
Disputes, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1709, 1728 (1998) (explaining that ADR is often preferred in trade secret litigation 
because “[b]y the very nature of the issues involved, usually at least one party . . . is very concerned about 
maintaining the secrecy of the trade secret or other confidential or proprietary information”). 
 218. See supra note 208 and accompanying text. Even if an arbitration clause is included, however, some 
of these disputes may still end up in federal court for preliminary relief, such as a temporary restraining order or 
preliminary injunction. See, e.g., Oldham Graphic Supply, Inc. v. Cornwell, No. 09-1250-WEB-KMH, 2009 WL 
3003850 (D. Kan. Sept. 17, 2009) (preliminarily enjoining former employee from engaging in business activities 
in violation of noncompete agreement pending the completion of arbitration proceedings); St. Jude Med. S.C., 
Inc. v. Hasty, No. CIV 06-4547, 2007 WL 128856 (D. Minn. Jan. 12, 2007) (granting a preliminary injunction 
against a former employee from violating noncompete and non-solicitation provisions and referring the matter 
to arbitration). 
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of CNCs (and other post-employment restraints) across a wide variety of firms 
and workers based upon a study of slightly over 500 employment agreements. 
Third, many variables in the dataset were hand coded, which is a potential 
source of error. For example, if the variables are ambiguous or include room for 
subjectivity, this could result in inconsistent application and may negatively 
impact reproducibility.219 However, this concern can be mitigated by creating, 
pilot testing, and implementing written coding instructions that all coders220 
must follow, as was done in this project.221 In addition, the Author personally 
reviewed all of the coding decisions to ensure accuracy. 
Fourth, information for some of the variables was missing, either because 
the employment agreement was not available (and the complaint did not include 
sufficient information to code), or because certain information was not included 
in or redacted from the agreement. This was a particular issue, for example, for 
salary information, which was only available for 89 of the 532 employees (17%). 
This issue was addressed by indicating missing values in the dataset and 
reporting on this situation in the results below. 
III.  RESULTS 
This Part summarizes the results from the collected data, primarily through 
descriptive statistics. It first provides a variety of information regarding the 
employees in the dataset who were subject to either a CNC, an NSA, or both, 
and their employers. It next summarizes data regarding CNCs in the employment 
agreements. Finally, it describes some information about NSAs in these 
agreements. 
A. EMPLOYEES AND EMPLOYERS 
As previously described, the position (job type) and industry for each 
employee covered by a CNC and/or NSA was coded. Figure 1 below shows job 
types for these employees.  
 
 
 219. See EPSTEIN & MARTIN, supra note 174, at 95–105 (describing best practices for coding). 
 220. The coders for this project were law students who were employed as the Author’s research assistants. 
 221. In empirical research, written coding instructions are preferred so that all coders apply the same criteria 
for each coding decision. This promotes consistency in coding and also serves as “a check against looking, 
consciously or not, for confirmation of predetermined positions.” Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic 
Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 63, 81 (2008); see also EPSTEIN & MARTIN, supra note 
174, at 106–12 (“[T]he primary goal of a codebook is to minimize human judgment—to leave as little as possible 
to interpretation.”). The written coding instructions for this project will be made available at: 
http://christopherbseaman.com. 
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FIGURE 1. EMPLOYEE JOB TYPES 
 
4% (19 employees) were the President or CEO, with another 21% (100 
employees) as other senior management, such as a Vice President or Regional 
Manager. 12% (66 employees) worked in technical or engineering positions, 
while the largest group was sales and customer service staff at 38% (200 
employees). 6% (29 employees) were current or former owners of a business,222 
while the remaining 20% (108 employees) had other job descriptions223 or their 
jobs were unknown. 
Figure 2 below shows the industry in which the employees worked, based 
on the employer named in the relevant agreement. 
 
 
 222. These cases often involved CNCs and/or NSAs signed as a part of the sale of the owner’s business to 
the new employer. 
 223. For example, independent contractors who were subject to a CNC and/or NSA were classified in this 
category. 
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FIGURE 2. INDUSTRY OF EMPLOYER 
 
The most common industries represented in the dataset are: finance and 
insurance, 20% (105 employees); manufacturing, 17% (87 employees); 
professional, scientific, and technical services, 16% (83 employees); and 
wholesale and retail trade, 15% (79 employees). The next most common 
industries are: administrative and support services, 8% (40 employees); 
information services, 8% (40 employees); health care and social assistance, 4% 
(21 employees); construction, 3% (18 employees); and transportation, 3% (17 
employees). The least common industries in the dataset are: real estate leasing 
and lending, 2% (8 employees); lodging and food services, 1% (7 employees); 
other services, 1% (7 employees); mining, 1% (6 employees); utilities, 1% (6 
employees); agriculture, less than 1% (2 employees); education, less than 1% (2 
employees); and management, less than 1% (2 employees). 
B. COVENANTS NOT-TO-COMPETE 
Of the 532 employees studied, 66% (351 employees) were covered by a 
post-employment CNC. This Subpart details the duration (length) and 
geographic scope of these CNCs, plus the salary information for employees 
covered by CNCs. 
Figure 3 below reports the duration (length) of CNCs following 
termination of employment. 
 















Health Care and Social Assistance
Arts and Entertainment
Lodging and Food Services
Other Services
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FIGURE 3. DURATION OF CNCS 
 
The most common duration of a CNC is one year, for a slight majority of 
covered employees (52%, 181 employees), followed by two years as the next 
most common (17%, 59 employees). In total, 86% of CNCs were for two years 
or less. On the other end of the spectrum, 10% of CNCs (34 employees) were 
longer than two years, with 5% (16 employees) who were subject to CNCs of 
five years or more. In particular, owners or former owners of a business had a 
longer-than-normal CNC, with a mean duration of 32.5 months. 












< 1 Year 1 Year Between
1-2 Years
2 Years > 2 Years Silent /
Unknown
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FIGURE 4. GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE OF CNCS 
 
Almost 40% of all CNCs (138 employees) either did not have an express 
geographic limit or applied worldwide. 4% (14 employees) of CNCs applied to 
the entire United States, while an additional 8% of CNCs (29 employees) applied 
to the United States and at least one additional country (but less than the entire 
world). 5% (16 employees) of CNCs applied to only part of the United States 
(but greater than a single state), while 17% (58 employees) applied to one state 
or less (local). 16% (55 employees) of CNCs applied anywhere the employer 
did business. 5% (19 employees) of CNCs listed another geographic scope for 
the CNC (for instance, within a certain distance of anywhere the employee 
worked or serviced customers), and 6% (22 employees) of CNCs had an 
unknown geographic scope (for instance, if the employment agreement was not 
available).  
The dataset also provided evidence to support the “California effect”—
namely, that employees in California are less likely to be covered by a CNC.224 
Of the 532 employees in the dataset, 42 of them were subject to employment 
 
 224. One potential limitation on this finding is that employers—knowing that a noncompete covering a 
California-based employee is likely invalid—probably will not sue to try to enforce it. As a result, employment 
agreements with unenforceable noncompetes would be less likely to appear in our dataset. But even 
unenforceable noncompetes may have an in terrorem effect that can decrease labor mobility. See Blake, supra 
note 12, at 682 (“For every covenant that finds it way to court, there are thousands which exercise an in terrorerm 
effect on employees who respect their contractual obligations . . . .”); see also Rachel Arnow-Richman, The New 
Enforcement Regime: Revisiting the Law of Employee Competition (and the Scholarship of Professor Charles 
Sullivan) with 2020 Vision, 50 SETON HALL L. REV. 1223, 1252 (2020) (reviewing the relevant literature and 
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agreements governed by California law. Only two of these agreements (5%) 
contained a CNC.225 In contrast, of the remaining 496 employees with 
agreements not governed by California law, 72% (349 employees) included a 
CNC. This difference is statistically significant.226 Similarly, for trade secret 
litigation filed in a federal court in California, only 18% of cases (9 out of 49) 
involved an employment agreement with a CNC, compared to 71% (342 of 483) 
of employment agreements in cases filed outside of California. Again, this 
difference was statistically significant.227  
Summary information regarding the annual base salaries (for instance, 
excluding bonuses, sales commissions, stock options, or other forms of financial 
incentives) of employees covered by CNCs is reported in Table 1 below.228  
 








The median base salary of all employees covered by a CNC is $120,000, 
with the 25th percentile at $90,000 and the 75th percentile at $200,000. Notably, 
almost 30% of employees (19 of 65) subject to a CNC had an annual base salary 
of less than $100,000, with 14% (9 of 65) having a base salary of $50,000 or 
less. In sum, most employees covered by CNCs for whom base salary 
information was available fell within the top 20% of all Americans in terms of 
personal income, but CNCs also covered employees with base salaries as low as 
$20,000 per year. 
In terms of income by job types, Presidents and CEOs subject to a CNC 
had the highest median base salary ($400,000), followed by other senior 
management ($185,000). Technical and engineering staff subject to a CNC had 
a median base salary of $82,500, and sales and customer service workers had a 
median base salary of $85,000.229 Current and former owners subject to a CNC 
had a median base salary of $225,000. Employees with other job types subject 
to CNCs had a median base salary of $96,000.  
 
 225. In one of these cases, the presence or absence of a CNC could not be determined because the 
employment agreement was not available. See Complaint, Insight Global, LLC v. Beacon Hill Staffing Grp., 
LLC, 2018 WL 6573081 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2018) (No. 17-CV-00309). 
 226. The p-value for both Pearson’s chi-square and Fisher’s exact tests was < 0.001. 
 227. The p-value for both Pearson’s chi-square and Fisher’s exact tests was < 0.001. 
 228. Salary information was publicly available for 65 of 351 employees covered by a CNC. See supra Part 
II.C (noting this issue). 
 229. Notably, 14 of the 15 employees (93%) that fell into this category had an employment agreement that 
made them eligible for additional compensation, such as sales commissions and bonuses, meaning that these 
employees’ total annual income was likely higher than their base salary. 
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C. NON-SOLICITATION AGREEMENTS 
This study also examined evidence from employment agreements 
regarding the frequency and scope of NSAs. 90% of all employees (477 of 532) 
in the dataset were covered by an NSA. More detailed information regarding the 
frequency and type of these NSAs is listed in Table 2 below. 
 
TABLE 2. FREQUENCY AND TYPE OF NSAS 
Type # Employees % Employees 
Customers Only 29 6% 
Employees Only 86 16% 
Both Customers and Employees 362 68% 
No NSA 45 8% 
Unknown 10 2% 
 
In particular, 73% of employees (391 of 532) in the dataset were prohibited 
from soliciting customers of their former employer, and 84% of employees (448 
of 532) were subject to an anti-raiding clause (non-solicitation of other 
employees). Not surprisingly, sales and customer service staff (84%, 162 of 192 
employees) and current and former business owners (84%, 16 of 19 employees) 
were most likely to be prohibited from soliciting the customers of their former 
employer. 
The duration of NSAs was similar to CNCs. Figure 5 below shows the time 
length of NSAs prohibiting solicitation of customers of the former employer. 
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FIGURE 5. DURATION OF NSAS FOR CUSTOMERS 
 
The most common length of an NSA prohibiting the solicitation of former 
customers was one year (58%, 225 of 391 employees), followed by two years 
(23%, 90 of 391 employees). Only 5% of employees (21 of 391) were subject to 
an NSA that lasted longer than 24 months. At the other end of the spectrum, only 
3% of employees (13 of 391) had an NSA of less than a year. 
Figure 6 below shows the duration of NSAs prohibiting the worker from 
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FIGURE 6. DURATION OF NSAS FOR OTHER EMPLOYEES 
 
The distribution of the duration of NSAs prohibiting solicitation of other 
employees is very similar to that of NSAs prohibiting solicitation of former 
customers. The most common length of an NSA prohibiting the solicitation of 
other employees was one year (57%, 257 of 448 employees), followed by two 
years (22%, 100 of 448 employees). Only 4% of employees (18 of 448) were 
subject to an NSA that lasted longer than 24 months. At the other end of the 
spectrum, 4% of employees (18 of 448) had an NSA of less than a year. 
Interestingly, the data also suggests that firms use NSAs as a partial 
substitute for CNCs for California-based employees. Of the 42 employment 
agreements that were governed by California law, all of them (100%) contained 
an NSA, compared to 90% of employees (440 of 490) with agreements governed 
by another jurisdiction’s law. Similarly, nearly all cases (95%, 47 of 49 
employees) filed in a federal court in California alleged a breach of an NSA. 
Summary information regarding the annual base salaries (for example, 
excluding bonuses, sales commissions, stock options, or other forms of financial 
incentives) of employees covered by NSAs is reported in Table 3 below.230  
  
 
 230. Salary information was publicly available for 83 of 477 employees covered by a NSA. See supra Part 








< 1 Year 1 Year Between
1-2 Years
2 Years > 2 Years Silent /
Unknown
# Employees
April 2021] NONCOMPETES & POST-EMPLOYMENT RESTRAINTS 1221 








The median base salary of all employees covered by an NSA is $110,000, 
with the 25th percentile at $75,000 and the 75th percentile at almost $200,000. 
Almost 40% of employees (33 of 83) subject to an NSA had an annual base 
salary of less than $100,000, with 20% (17 of 83) having a base salary of $50,000 
or less.  
IV.  IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
This Part first describes several implications from the results described 
above. It then discusses possible directions for future research regarding CNCs 
and other post-employment restraints on competition, as well as other 
contractual clauses that may impact innovation.  
A. IMPLICATIONS 
First, the results reinforce findings from previous empirical research that 
CNCs and other post-employment restraints on competition are frequently used 
by employers to cover workers in “high-skill, high paying jobs.”231 Nonetheless, 
the data also suggests that a substantial number of lower-wage workers are 
covered by CNCs and/or NSAs as well. Specifically, approximately 15% of 
employees covered by CNCs for whom salary information was available had an 
annual base salary below the median U.S. household income.232 This is 
consistent with the large-scale survey conducted by Starr et al., which found that 
13.3% of workers who earn less than $40,000 per year report being currently 
bound by a CNC.233 In particular, it raises questions about whether CNCs that 
cover low-wage, lower-skill employees are being used to protect an employer’s 
legitimate interests, or instead whether they are being improperly imposed “to 
 
 231. Starr et al., supra note 2, at 1. 
 232. See JESSICA SEMEGA, MELISSA KOLLAR, EMILY A. SHRIDER & JOHN F. CREAMER, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2019, at 4 fig.1 (2020), https://www.census.gov/ 
content/dam/Census/library/publications/2020/demo/p60-270.pdf (showing a median household income of 
$68,703 for 2019). The annual base salary may understate employees’ actual income, however, as it does not 
include any income from sales commissions, bonus, or stock incentives. See supra notes 222, 228 and 
accompanying text. 
 233. Starr et al., supra note 2, at 6. In total, 33.0% of employees who make less than $40,000 per year report 
being ever bound by a CNC. Id. 
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exercise economic control over certain classes of employees” by limiting their 
freedom of mobility.234  
Second, the employment agreements studied suggest that the primary 
limitation on the scope of CNCs is duration, rather than geography. Indeed, 
nearly half of all CNCs studied were effectively worldwide in their geographic 
scope.235 This was somewhat surprising, as the literature and case law on 
noncompetes indicates that geographic limits often are significant in 
determining whether a CNC is reasonable in scope.236 However, the absence of 
a geographic limitation in many CNCs may better comport with our modern, 
information-based economy. For example, even a small business may have a 
national or global customer base via the Internet, so competition could literally 
occur anywhere in the world.237 In addition, because CNCs are often used to 
protect against the disclosure of trade secret or confidential business 
information, a broad geographic scope may be appropriate, “because once an 
employee has divulged a trade secret in any location[,] the likelihood that it will 
become public knowledge available to immediate competitors is greatly 
increased.”238  
 
 234. Narragansett Coated Paper Corp. v. Lapierre, No. C.A. PC 97-2842, 1998 WL 388400, at *2 (R.I. 
Super. Ct. June 25, 1998); see also Ecology Servs., Inc. v. Clym Env’t Servs., LLC, 952 A.2d 999, 1004 (Md. 
Ct. Spec. App. 2008) (affirming trial court decision to decline enforcement of CNCs against “clearly low level 
employees” who were “not utilizing skills against whom covenants not to compete could be enforced”); BHB 
Inv. Holdings, L.L.C. v. Ogg, No. 330045, 2017 WL 723789, at *5 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 21, 2017) (refusing to 
enforce CNC for “a low-level employee with general knowledge and skills in swimming and swim instruction” 
because “[h]e had no valuable insider information that could be used for corporate espionage”). 
 235. See supra Part III.B. 
 236. See DONALD J. ASPELUND & JOAN E. BECKNER, EMPLOYEE NONCOMPETITION LAW § 6:8 (2020 ed.) 
(“Although sometimes characterized as preliminary considerations, area limitations are important ones. Area 
limitations frequently appear in covenants not to compete.”) (footnotes omitted); Blake, supra note 12, at 675 
(“The traditional dimensions of a [CNC] have been those of duration and geographic area.”); Whitmore, supra 
note 24, at 489 (“When determining the enforceability of a [CNC], the court will examine many different factors, 
the most prominent of which are thought to be the length of the time restraint and the breadth of the geographical 
restraint.”) (footnote omitted); see also Arcor, Inc. v. Haas, 842 N.E.2d 265, 273 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (finding a 
CNC “unenforceable because it contained no geographic limitation” and thus was effectively a “blanket 
prohibition on competition”). 
 237. See, e.g., PrecisionIR Inc. v. Clepper, 693 F. Supp. 2d 286, 292–93 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (finding that a 
CNC’s geographic limitation prohibiting competition anywhere in the United States and Canada was reasonable 
because the employer “has clients and does business over the Internet”); Nat’l Bus. Servs., Inc. v. Wright, 2 F. 
Supp. 2d 701, 708 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (holding that a CNC that applied in any state where the employer conducted 
business was reasonable in geographic scope because “[t]ransactions involving the Internet, unlike traditional 
‘sales territory’ cases, are not limited by state boundaries”); see also Friese v. Fadner Media Enters., LLC, No. 
FSTCV146021437, 2017 WL 1238436, at *6–7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 18, 2017) (“[T]he law has come to 
acknowledge the inapplicability of geographic bounds to companies that do business on a national or 
international basis. This trend is particularly applicable to a business operating on the [I]nternet.”) (citations 
omitted). 
 238. Blake, supra note 12, at 679; see also id. at 675 (“Restraints mainly concerned with protecting 
confidential information are likely to be inadequate if they contain any geographic limitation . . . .”); Universal 
Engraving, Inc. v. Duarte, 519 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1152–53 (D. Kan. 2007) (finding a CNC with a worldwide 
geographic scope to be reasonable because the employer’s “confidential information can be utilized through 
using a computer to transport the information, thus giving the information an easy route to travel worldwide, 
even if [the covered employee] did not move to another country”). 
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In comparison, current CNCs are, on balance, shorter in duration than those 
in previous empirical studies. Specifically, the most common length of a CNC 
in this study is one year, with the vast majority lasting two years or less.239 In 
contrast, the average duration of an enforceable CNC in the 1960s was over two 
years.240 In industries where innovation is rapid, such as biotechnology, CNCs 
that last more than a year may substantially impede innovation by effectively 
sidelining highly-skilled employees and interfering with their ability to keep up 
with ongoing change.241 In addition, if the anticipated duration of a trade secret 
is short—for instance, if reverse engineering is common, or if other competitors 
can be expected to learn or independently discover the secret on their own—then 
CNCs of shorter duration may be appropriate.242 
Third, the results in this study suggest that the “California effect”243 is 
real—in other words, that firms with California employees are less likely to 
include CNCs in their employment agreements. However, it also suggests that 
that California employers are using NSAs as an alternative to CNCs in an 
attempt to impose some post-employment limits on competition.244 This 
suggests that policymakers who are considering legislation limiting the 
enforceability of CNCs should also consider the potential anticompetitive 
impact of NSAs as well. 
Fourth, the dataset contains examples of CNCs that appear to be facially 
invalid under current state law. For instance, even though noncompetes are 
generally unenforceable under California and Oklahoma law,245 several 
employment agreements with a choice of law clause for these states contain 
CNCs.246 Even though these covenants are unenforceable, they nonetheless may 
deter employees from changing jobs. As Cynthia Estlund has explained, “[e]ven 
a manifestly invalid non-compete may have in terrorem value against an 
employee without counsel.”247  
 
 239. See supra Part III.B. 
 240. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
 241. See Graves & DiBoise, supra note 73, at 330 (contending that “[a] one-year non-competition covenant 
is a substantial limitation on a skilled employee looking to find the most productive and innovative position 
available”). 
 242. See Blake, supra note 12, at 678 (“[W]hen the confidential information known by the employee will 
lose its business significance in a short period of time, that period sets the outside limit for the effective duration 
of the restraint . . . .”). 
 243. See Bishara et al., supra note 1, at 15. 
 244. See supra note 57 (discussing the uncertain status of NSAs under California law). 
 245. See supra notes 48–51 and accompanying text. 
 246. See, e.g., Employee Confidentiality Agreement Between AllCells, LLC and Jack Y. Zhai 3 (June 1, 
2010), https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Bo-iFCmJcgJ4XzmKyMUnG2HgvSKQphJp (including a one-year 
noncompete clause and selecting California as governing law); Employment Agreement Between SOAProjects, 
Inc., and Jayaraman Swaminathan 4–5 (July 7, 2008), https://drive.google.com/open?id=1RRC_kJu-
D2uk6305E8KuSeCeCpYf-2j2 (stating terms of employment, including a one-year noncompete law, and 
selecting California as governing law); Employment Agreement Between Innovative Healthcare Systems, Inc., 
and Larry C. Winstead §§ 6, 13 (Jan. 1, 2008), https://drive.google.com/file/d/19oJDD1GO23wzt0RRPey9vhK-
Dmlxyvx0/view (containing a three-year noncompete clause and selecting Oklahoma as governing law). 
 247. Estlund, supra note 208, at 423; accord Catherine L. Fisk, Commentary, Reflections on the New 
Psychological Contract and the Ownership of Human Capital, 34 CONN. L. REV. 765, 782–83 (2002) (noting 
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Finally, the enactment of the DTSA has—perhaps inadvertently—opened 
the doors of federal courthouses across the country to hear claims that employees 
have breached post-employment restrictions on competition. As the Author 
found in a previous study, the majority of DTSA cases also involve breach of 
contract and/or employment law claims.248 Although breach of an employment 
contract is ordinarily a state law cause of action, federal courts can exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over these claims when they are part of the same “case 
or controversy” as a federal law claim such as the DTSA.249 The alleged breach 
of a CNC is often factually intertwined with a federal trade secrets claim under 
the DTSA because one of the main purposes of a noncompete is to protect 
against the disclosure of trade secret information to a competitor.250 As a result, 
employment disputes involving CNCs and/or NSA are being swept into federal 
court when, prior to the DTSA, they would have been heard in state court 
instead.251 
B. DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
There are a number of potential directions for expansion of this study’s 
empirical research into noncompetes and other post-employment restraints on 
competition. First, the number of employee agreements studied could be 
significantly expanded. This empirical study included slightly over 500 
employment agreements that were identified in 689 cases, representing a single 
year of trade secret litigation in federal court under the DTSA. However, the 
entirety of trade secret litigation is much larger. For instance, Lex Machina252 
recently released a module of over 9600 trade secret cases filed in federal court 
since 2009.253 If these cases contain employment agreements with CNCs and/or 
NSAs at a rate comparable to the current dataset, this would result in thousands 
of additional documents for coding and incorporation into the dataset.  
Second, the existing employment agreements (and any additional ones) 
could be coded for more variables. For instance, employers in these agreements 
could be coded based on size and location.254 In addition, employee job types 
 
that some employers “may ask their employees to sign” contracts with unenforceable noncompete clauses, 
“presumably counting on the in terrorem value of the contract when the employee does not know that the contract 
is unenforceable”). 
 248. See Levine & Seaman, supra note 177, at 143 tbl.4 (finding that 70% of DTSA lawsuits also involved 
a breach of contract claim). 
 249. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a); see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 558 (2005) 
(explaining that § 1367(a) confers “broad grant of supplemental jurisdiction over other claims within the same 
case or controversy, as long as the action is one in which the district courts would have original jurisdiction”). 
 250. See supra notes 67–70 and accompanying text. 
 251. See Dennis Crouch, DTSA as a Shoe Horn for Contract and Employment Law Claims, PATENTLY-O 
(Apr. 28, 2016), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2016/04/contract-employment-claims.html. 
 252. LEX MACHINA, https://lexmachina.com (last visited Apr. 19, 2021).  
 253. Press Release, Lex Machina, Lex Machina Launches Highly Anticipated Legal Analytics Module for 
Trade Secret Litigation (May 30, 2018), https://lexmachina.com/media/press/lex-machina-launches-highly-
anticipated-legal-analytics-module-for-trade-secret-litigation. 
 254. Firm size information is available from a number of sources, including the U.S. Census Bureau’s 
Survey of Business Owners and Self-Employed Persons (SBO) and the U.S. Department of Labor’s Business 
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could be coded into more granular categories. Employment agreements could 
also be coded for information regarding the frequency and scope of non-
disclosure agreements (NDAs). Furthermore, data regarding an employment 
contact’s specified remedies for breach of a CNC, such as monetary damages, 
liquidated damages, preliminary and/or permanent injunctive relief, attorney’s 
fees, and court costs, could be gathered. 
Another possible area for future empirical research from employment 
agreements in trade secret litigation are other contractual terms regarding 
innovation. For instance, based on the Author’s review, a number of 
employment contracts contain provisions regarding the assignment of inventions 
and patent rights. Some contracts also contain provisions regarding the 
employer’s rights in other forms of intellectual property created by their 
employees during the course of employment, such as copyrights and trade 
secrets. In addition, many of the agreements included in the dataset also include 
language regarding remedies in the event that the contract’s terms are breached, 
such as liquidated damages clauses and provisions awarding attorney’s fees and 
court costs to a prevailing employer. In short, employment agreements publicly 
disclosed in trade secret litigation may prove to be a rich source of data regarding 
other contractual obligations that may affect the creation and ownership of 
intellectual property rights. 
CONCLUSION 
Noncompetes and other post-employment restraints on competition, such 
as nonsolicitation agreements, are one of the most significant and important 
issues not just in employment law, but in innovation policy and economic 
development as well. In light of the theoretical debate regarding the normative 
desirability of noncompetes, more data about the frequency, scope, and impact 
of these restraints is needed to assist policymakers who are grappling with these 
issues at both the federal and state levels. 
This study makes a modest contribution to that effort by collecting and 
reporting information regarding an original dataset of employment agreements 
containing noncompetes and/or nonsolicitation agreements that have been 
publicly disclosed in trade secret litigation. Based on this data, it appears that 
the use of noncompetes by U.S. employers goes well beyond the C-suite and 
often extends to technical and sales staff. In addition, although employees 
subject to noncompetes often are well compensated, some lower-wage workers 
are also subject to them. Furthermore, it appears that firms employing 
California-based workers are using nonsolicitation agreements as an alternative 
to noncompetes. Finally, the data and methodology used in this study can be 
adapted to study a number of additional issues at the intersection of contract and 
employment law and innovation policy.  
 
Employment Dynamics data. See Survey of Business Owners and Self-Employed Persons (SBO), U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/sbo.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2021); Business Employment 
Dynamics, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., https://www.bls.gov/bdm/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2021). 
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